Virginia Commonwealth University

VCU Scholars Compass
Theses and Dissertations

Graduate School

2013

Soldiers for Democracy: Karl Loewenstein, John H. Herz, Militant
Democracy and the Defense of the Democratic State
Ben Plache
Virginia Commonwealth University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd
Part of the History Commons
© The Author

Downloaded from
https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd/2995

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at VCU Scholars Compass. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of VCU Scholars Compass.
For more information, please contact libcompass@vcu.edu.

©Ben Plache
2013
All Rights Reserved

Soldiers for Democracy:
Karl Loewenstein, John H. Herz, Militant Democracy
and the Defense of the Democratic State
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts at
Virginia Commonwealth University.

by
Ben Plache
Bachelor of Arts, Virginia Commonwealth University, 2011

Director: Dr. Joseph Bendersky
Professor, Department of History

Virginia Commonwealth University
Richmond, Virginia
May 2013

Acknowledgements

No scholarly work is an individual effort, and without the help of countless others this thesis
would never have been completed. In particular I would like to thank Dr. Joseph Bendersky, my
thesis advisor, for his time, his academic generosity and his commitment to education and
scholarship. Without his guidance, this thesis, and my time in graduate school, would have been
considerably different and undoubtedly poorer. I would like to also thank Dr. Timothy Thurber
and Dr. Robert Godwin-Jones for generously agreeing to serve on my thesis committee.
I owe thanks to the efforts of librarians at Virginia Commonwealth University, Amherst College
and the University at Albany. John Glover with VCU Libraries deserves particular mention –
without his knowledge of academic research, and his commitment to student success, I would
never have completed graduate school, let alone finished a thesis.
Thank you to Dr. Leigh Ann Craig, whose guidance, friendship and support helped convince me
to pursue graduate studies in the first place, and helped make my first year as a graduate student
seem manageable.
Kathleen Murphy and the professional staff of the History Department also deserve special
mention – thank you for always providing a sympathetic ear and a friendly face, and for
transforming what could have been a dull computer lab into an inviting safe haven.
Finally, thank you to my fellow graduate students. Without your friendship and your support,
graduate school would have been nothing more than an endless procession of grading, studying,
reading and writing.

ii

Table of Contents
Abstract

iv

Introduction:
Karl Loewenstein, John Herz and the Flight From Fascism

1

Chapter One:
The Academic: Karl Loewenstein and the Development of Militant Democracy

13

Chapter Two:
The Advocate: Karl Loewenstein and the Public Campaign for Militant Democracy

51

Chapter Three:
Brothers-in-Thought: John Herz, Karl Loewenstein and the Pessimistic Worldview

84

Conclusion:
The Lasting Influence of Militant Democracy

107

Bibliography

113

Vita

120

iii

Abstract

SOLDIERS FOR DEMOCRACY: KARL LOEWENSTEIN, JOHN H. HERZ, MILITANT
DEMOCRACY AND THE DEFENSE OF THE DEMOCRATIC STATE
By Ben Plache, Master of Arts
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the degree of Master of Arts at Virginia
Commonwealth University.
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2013
Director: Dr. Joseph Bendersky
Professor, Department of History

This thesis explores the work of two German Jewish émigré scholars, Karl Loewenstein
and John H. Herz, and how they confronted the conflict between fascism and democracy
throughout the 1930s and during World War II. Loewenstein, in academic publications and later
through a campaign of public advocacy, urged the adoption of his theory of militant democracy
for the protection of democratic institutions. Originally conceived as temporary legislation to
deprive fascists of the fundamental rights they abused in order to seize power, this theory
evolved into the understanding by Loewenstein that fascist and democratic states could not
coexist, and that fundamental changes must be implemented within the legislative and executive
branches of democratic governments to create a more responsive, flexible system. Defined by his
iv

pessimistic worldview, Loewenstein was acutely anxious about fascism, especially after the start
of World War II. In contrast to Loewenstein, and despite his own pessimism, Herz conceived of
an international system that combined both realism and idealism in order to obviate man’s
violent and suspicious anthropology and create a peaceful international order in which nations,
regardless of their particular political ideology, could coexist.

v

“Now the chasms of the 20th century were revealed:
the abyss of racism that was to end in holocaust; total war,
already foreshadowed in the blood-filled trenches of
World War I… All of this destroyed [the] remnants of still
existing rationalistic belief in “inevitable progress.”
The world became a theater of the absurd, and I became
more and more pessimistic.”
- John H. Herz

1

Introduction:
Karl Loewenstein, John Herz and the Flight from Fascism

In April 1933, shortly after his appointment as Chancellor, Adolf Hitler passed the “Law
to Restore the Professional Civil Service,”1 which, with few exceptions, removed non-Aryans
from government positions, targeting Jews in particular.2 For the thousands of German Jewish
intellectuals working in government service and teaching at German universities, this law was
cataclysmic, removing them from positions they had occupied for decades, and severing them
from the life that they labored to build.3 Statistically, in 1933, following passage of the law, more
than 16 percent of university faculty lost their jobs, and over the next six years, especially after
passage of further restrictions, this number rose to greater than one-fourth of all university
teachers.4 Social scientists and political scientists were especially hard hit, with some universities

1

Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums

2

Claus-Dieter Krohn, Intellectuals in Exile: Refugee Scholars and the New School for Social Research
(Cambridge: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1993), 12.
3

For further information on the émigrés and their experiences, see Peter M. Rutkoff and William B. Scott,
New School: A History of the New School for Social Research (New York: Free Press, 1986); Donald P. Kent, The
Refugee Intellectual: The Americanization of the Immigrants 1933-1951 (New York: Columbia University Press,
1953); Maurice B. Davie, Refugees in America: Report of the Committee for the Study of Recent Immigration from
Europe (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947); H. Stuart Hughes, The Sea Change: The Migration of Social
Thought, 1930-1945 (New York: Harper & Row, 1975); Anthony Heilbut, Exiled in Paradise: German Refugee
Artists and Intellectuals in America From the 1930s to the Present (Boston: University of California Press, 1983).
Herz discusses his immigration experience at length in his biography, which is reviewed in Chapter Three.
4

Krohn, Intellectuals in Exile, 12.

2

losing over 50% of their staff, resulting in “the eliminat[ion] of an entire [new] research tradition
critical of the historicism and idealism long dominant in German thinking.”5
For many of these dismissed university professors, leaving Germany was the best option,
and aided by newly formed international rescue committees, over 50% of those who lost their
jobs in 1933 – 650 total – immigrated from Germany.6 By the end of the 1930s this number had
risen to over 1,700, and, including doctors, lawyers, artists and writers, to over 12,000.7 While
initially most of these émigrés chose to remain in Europe to stay closer to Germany, faced with
Hitler’s march across Europe, as well as the difficulty of “shedding one’s status as an alien in
Europe,” ever growing numbers of intellectuals chose to leave Europe for America, until by the
start of World War II by far the largest proportion of German émigrés had found residence in the
United States.8 In America, these intellectuals saw President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and
especially his New Deal, as the heir to their progressive work during the failed Weimar
Republic, and appreciated the ease with which they, as immigrants in a country full of
immigrants, could blend into society at large, making “the process of reintegration exceedingly
simple.”9
Despite this openness, the path of the German Jewish immigrant was fraught with
difficulties. These scholars were forced to compete for scarce permanent teaching positions at

5

Krohn, Intellectuals in Exile, 13.

6

Krohn, Intellectuals in Exile, 11, 15.

7

Krohn, Intellectuals in Exile, 11.

8

Franz L. Neumann, The Cultural Migration: The European Scholar in America (New York: A. S. Barnes,

1961).
9

Krohn, Intellectuals in Exile, 17; Neumann, Cultural Migration, 18-19. See also Neumann’s entire
description of his time in America. He writes: “[a]s impressive, if not more so, was the character of the American
people, its essential friendliness, the neighborly, almost comradely spirit. Many have analyzed their traits and sung
their praises, and I need not repeat all this.” Neumann, Cultural Migration, 18. There is no similar sentiment found
in either Herz or Loewenstein’s papers.
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xenophobic and anti-Semitic American universities that regarded them with suspicion.10 It was
only after American universities realized the positive benefit German faculty members had on
the academic quality of departments that a larger number of teaching positions became available,
and American institutions became more willing to hire Germans.11 Even after securing teaching
positions, these intellectuals still had to cope with the psychological consequences of their
sudden dismissals and forced immigrations, and watch as Hitler and Nazi Germany successfully
conquered much of Europe, spreading fascism across the European continent throughout the
1930s and 1940s.
Such experiences profoundly altered the worldview of some of these émigrés, causing
them to both reassess their academic work, as well as look at the world through new, pessimistic
eyes.12 This thesis tells the story of two of Jewish German émigré intellectuals, Karl Loewenstein
(1891–1973) and John H. Herz (1908-2005), and how they responded, through their work, to
their immigrant experience and the dilemma to democracy presented by fascism’s widespread
success. While both are ancillary figures in the greater history of the émigrés, their work – and
especially Loewenstein’s – showcase how scholars attempted to understand the new world they
found themselves a part of, as well as to protect the nation that had become their home and
represented the last bastion of democracy and free thought.
After his immigration to the United States in 1933, Loewenstein began to research the
ways in which democracies could defend themselves from fascism. Faced with the apparent
prospect of an endless, creeping tide of fascism, spreading across the globe and consuming
democratic nations from within, he argued for the adoption of militant democracy, or the idea
10

Krohn, Intellectuals in Exile, 22-24.

11

Krohn, Intellectuals in Exile, 24.

12

Neumann, Cultural Migration, 18.
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that democracies must proactively defend themselves against internal fascist threats. According
to Loewenstein, fascists were able to abuse the fundamental rights granted to them by democratic
constitutions – namely freedom of speech, press and assembly, and equal participation in the
electoral process – to destroy democracy from within. The key to defending democracy and
defeating fascists was to deny them these fundamental rights through temporary restrictive
legislation. Loewenstein presented this idea in four academic articles published in 1935 and
1937.
Confronted with the success of Hitler and Germany throughout the 1930s, Loewenstein
continued to develop his theory of militant democracy, and by 1938 had come to believe that
beyond temporary legislation, it was necessary for democracies to transform their legislative and
executive branches into smaller, more responsive bodies better able to cope with emergent
situations and the speed of the modern state. Key to understanding this evolution is
Loewenstein’s growing pessimism towards the future prospects of democracy, rooted in his
forced immigration from Germany, as well as his mounting anxiety about fascism. In 1935 and
1937 he still approached the conflict between democracy and fascism as an objective academic,
but by 1938 he became increasingly personally involved with the defense of democracy, arguing
urgently for the quick adoption of militant democracy in the United States in order to protect
America from the dire fascist threat.
This personal involvement manifested itself in an extensive campaign of public advocacy
for the passage of restrictive legislation in the United States. While he never revealed his entire
theory (especially his belief in the necessity to transform the American system), from 1938 until
1947 Loewenstein attempted, through book reviews, speeches and a pamphlet, to convince the
public of the necessity of restricting the right of fascists, as well as of the threat posed to
America by a hidden Fifth Column of fascist and fascist sympathizers poised to aid Hitler in
5

destroying the United States. This campaign took on a particular urgency in the aftermath of the
surprising and rapid defeat of France in 1940. Following this defeat, Loewenstein attempted to
do whatever he could to convince the general public of the urgent need to use militant democracy
in America, including presenting himself as a defender of traditional Anglo-Saxon Christian
American society, despite his nationality and ethnic heritage.
Following the attack on Pearl Harbor and the American entrance into the war,
Loewenstein, like many other German émigrés, joined the American government, eventually
assisting in denazification by interviewing Nazis as part of the Nuremburg prosecution. Even
after the final defeat of Hitler, Loewenstein’s advocacy for militant democracy continued, and he
remained pessimistic and anxious about fascism. He was publicly critical of denazification,
believing that the German citizenry were unrepentant, and that the American failure to
effectively root out and punish Nazis had set the stage for the reemergence of fascist Germany
and the continuation of the threat to the United States and democracy. During this period,
Loewenstein’s understanding of militant democracy continued to evolve as well, until, by 1944,
he had come to believe that it was impossible for democracies and fascist states to coexist.
Unfortunately, Loewenstein’s pessimism, his particular views on fascism, his public
campaign of advocacy for militant democracy and even the evolutions of this theory throughout
the 1930s and early 1940s are entirely missing from the historiography. Over the past two
decades, as scholars have confronted issues of domestic terrorism, human rights reforms and
sovereignty in the wake of the Cold War, they have returned to the idea of militant democracy as
a starting point for their research. As part of this research, Loewenstein has a newfound

6

relevance among political scientists, especially when examining democratic responses to national
threats.13
Little research has been done into Loewenstein for Loewenstein’s own sake. Virtually
every scholar writing about him does so in the context of another event, and their work gives the
impression that Loewenstein’s theory of militant democracy simply appeared in 1937, fully
formed, and remained static over the next decade. The best examination of Loewenstein’s life
and work to date is Markus Lang’s biography of Loewenstein, Karl Loewenstein:
Transatlantischer Denker der Politik, published in 2007 and based on Lang’s earlier dissertation.
However, even Lang’s biography is deficient, devoting only fifteen pages to Loewenstein’s work
on militant democracy, with no mention, beyond a single footnote, of Loewenstein’s campaign
of public advocacy for adoption of militant democracy in the United States.14 Instead, Lang opts
to focus on Loewenstein’s role in the development of political science as a field, and seeks to
integrate Loewenstein into the growing category of émigré transatlantic intellectuals who, by
leaving Germany, offered an implicit critique of the Nazi regime.15 Lang reiterated this approach
in a chapter on Loewenstein, “Karl Loewenstein: From Public Law to Political Science,” as part
of German Scholars in Exile: New Studies in Intellectual History, published in 2011.

13

Markus Thiel, “Introduction,” in The ‘Militant Democracy’ Principle in Modern Democracies, ed. Markus
Thiel (New York: Ashgate, 2009), 1-15.
14

Markus Lang, Karl Loewenstien: Transatlantischer Denker der Politik (Stuggart: Franz Steiner Verlag,
2007), 207-222. The single reference to Loewenstein’s public campaign can be found in a footnote on page 222,
where Lang references a speech given by Karl Loewenstein and Lawrence B. Packard at Amherst College in 1940.
For more on this speech see Chapter Two. Unfortunately, Lang does not analyze this speech at all, or even quote
from it.
15

Devin O. Pendas, “An Atlantic Giant,” review of Karl Loewenstein: Transatlantischer Denker der Politik,
by Markus Lang, April, 2010, H-Net. http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=hdiplo&month=1004&week=c&msg=NeuD8zGoQ9C8loBjoMkP%2BA&user=&pw=. For examples of similar
styles of works, see Uta Gerhardt, Denken in der Demokratie: Die Soziologie im atlantischen Transfer nach 1945
(Stuttgar: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2007); Matthias Stoffregen, Kampfen fur ein demokratisches Deustchland:
Emigraten zwischen Politik und Politkwissenshaft (Opladen: Leske und Budrich Verlag, 2002).
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The majority of works on Loewenstein and militant democracy, on the other hand, use
Loewenstein’s theories as part of a commentary on a present day dilemma – for example
terrorism – and devote little more than a footnote to Loewenstein or his work. There is no hint of
Loewenstein’s public advocacy for militant democracy, or of any evolution within his theory
throughout the 1930s and early 1940s. Typical of this category of works is a recent dissertation
on Loewenstein, “Militant Democracy,” by Svetlana Tyulkina, finished in 2011.16 While
Tyulkina does an excellent job of tracing the influence of Loewenstein’s work in the modern
world, as well as highlighting examples of legislation and constitutional amendments today that
are examples of militant democracy, she spends no time exploring the development of the theory,
or the greater intellectual context within which Loewenstein worked. Martin Klamt follows a
similar approach in his chapter, “Militant Democracy and the Democratic Dilemma: Different
Ways of Protecting Democratic Constitutions,” in Explorations in Legal Culture, published in
2007.17
The only mention of Loewenstein’s public campaign for militant democracy is found not
in a work within the Loewenstein historiography, but rather in an article about the German Jurist
Carl Schmitt’s interrogations as part of the Nuremburg Trials. Loewenstein, in his capacity as an
officer with the U.S. Military Government in Berlin (1945-1947), pressed American officials to
arrest Schmitt. While describing Loewenstein and Schmitt, Joseph W. Bendersky references a
letter to the editors of The New York Times written by Loewenstein that was highly critical of

16

Sveltana Tyulkina, “Militant Democracy,” (PhD diss., Central European University, 2011).

17

For similar works, see Paul Harvey, “Militant Democracy and the European Convention on Human
Rights,” European Law Review 3 (2004): 407-420; Leslie Turano, “Spain: Banning Political Parties as a Response
to Basque Terrorism,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 4 (2003): 730-740, among others. Tyulkina’s
dissertation includes a longer list of relevant works; see Tyulkina, “Militant Democracy,” 19-20. While these works
are relevant to modern day discussions of militant democracy, they are not particularly useful when researching
Loewenstein’s biography or the development of militant democracy.

8

denazification.18 This letter, along with others composed by him on the same subject, were part
of Loewenstein’s post-war campaign for the application of militant democracy in defeated
Germany. Beyond this reference, as well as the one found in Lang’s biography, no other
references to Loewenstein’s public statements exist.
**
Like Karl Loewenstein, John H. Herz’s immigration from Germany left him sharply
pessimistic. After arriving in America in 1938, while studying at Princeton, he began to
investigate the way in which international relations functioned, and how and why states came
into conflict with one another. Like Loewenstein, Herz joined the American government during
the war to help combat Nazism, and after the war was highly critical of denazification. During
this period, Herz concluded that man was inherently concerned with his personal security, and
that the knowledge that other men held the potential to kill him led to a state of constant,
potential violence, regardless of actual intent. Relations between nations were this
anthropological state, termed the security dilemma, writ large. Despite his pessimistic
anthropological view, Herz believed that, through a combination of measured realism and
idealism known as Liberal Realism, a peaceful world system could be achieved. Thus man,
cognizant of his nature, could overcome his native state and work towards a peaceful future.
While Herz acknowledged this future was unlikely to come to pass, his theory still held
the possibility for a world in which nations, independent of their political ideology, by pursuing
Liberal Realism, could peacefully coexist. Written in the years before World War II and the
beginning of the Cold War in the late 1940s, Herz’s theory was fundamentally concerned with
describing a world in which nations of competing ideological orientations, in particular

18

Joseph W. Bendersky, “Carl Schmitt’s Path to Nuremburg: A Sixty-Year Assesment,” TELOS 139 (2007):

21.

9

democracy and communism, could avoid destructive war. This potential for peace represents a
working out of Herz’s pessimism, despite his biography and worldview, and, in contrast with
Loewenstein, shows how unusual Loewenstein’s particular solution to the conflict between
fascism and democracy was.
Compared to Loewenstein, the Herz historiography is considerably smaller, arising only
in the past ten years, and focuses on Herz’s role in the development of international relations as a
field, and his participation in the wider community of such scholars in the post-War world. As
yet, no scholar has compared Herz to other émigré intellectuals, or explored the relationship
between his theories and Loewenstein’s militant democracy. Today, the leading academics
working on Herz are Peter Stirk, Jana Puglierin, Christian Hacke and Ken Booth. Puglierin has
written the only contemporary monograph on Herz, John H. Herz: Leben und Denken zwischen
Idealismus und Realismus, Deutschland und Amerika, published in German in 2011 and
developed from an earlier dissertation. Puglierin also helped edit a 2007 issue of International
Relations (a publication that Herz contributed to throughout his life) devoted to Herz’s work. In
this issue she, along with Hacke, contributed two articles on Herz’s life and work, “John H.
Herz: Balancing Utopia and Reality,” and “Toward Being a ‘Traveller Between All Worlds’.”
Along with Hacke and Puglierin, Ken Booth has written on Herz’s Political Realism and
Political Idealism in “Navigating the ‘Absolute Novum’: John H. Herz’s Political Realism and
Political Idealism.”
Peter Stirk also contributed to the Herz issue of International Relations. In “John H. Herz
and the International Law of the Third Reich,” he explores Herz’s conception of Nazi
international law and his work on this subject. Stirk also mentions Herz in a work on Carl
Schmitt, Carl Schmitt, Crown Jurist of the Third Reich: On Preemptive War, Military
Occupation, and World Empire, presenting Herz’s understanding of international relations as an
10

alternative to Schmitt’s.19 Looking forward, with the recent release of Herz’s papers, catalogued
at the University at Albany as part of their Jewish immigrants collection, it is likely that more
works devoted to his life and theories will be forthcoming.20
**
The story of Loewenstein and Herz is, fundamentally, a story of their pessimism, and
how this pessimism manifested itself in both their academic work and public discourse.
Chapter one provides a detailed analysis of Loewenstein’s academic work on militant
democracy, beginning in 1935 and ending in 1938. In this work, the evolution of militant
democracy can be first observed, as well as Loewenstein’s growing concern with fascism and the
threat posed by fascists to the United States. The second chapter explores Loewenstein’s public
advocacy for the adoption of antifascist legislation in the United States, beginning in 1938 and
concluding with his critique of denazification following his departure from government service
in 1947. Throughout this period, despite the defeat of Hitler by the Allies in 1945, Loewenstein
remained acutely anxious about fascism, and had little hope for the future of democracy. Chapter
19

Peter M. R. Stirk, Carl Schmitt, Crown Jurist of the Third Reich: On Preemptive War, Military Occupation,
and World Empire (London: Edwin Mellon Press, 2005).
20

Herz and Loewenstein were by no means the only scholars of international conflict working during this
period. Among many others, Carl Schmitt and Hans J. Morgenthau deserve particular mention. Schmitt, who stayed
behind in Germany and briefly joined the Nazi regime until he fell afoul of the SS in 1936, described the ‘equal
chance,’ an important theory to be aware of when reading Loewenstein, in his 1932 work Legality and Legitimacy.
See Carl Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, trans. Jeffrey Seitzer (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004): 28-33. For
secondary literature on Schmitt, see William E. Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt: The End of Law (London: Rowman &
Littlefield, 1999); Joseph W. Bendersky, Carl Schmitt, Theorist for the Reich (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1983); Michael G. Satler, Carl Schmitt: Law as Politics, Ideology and Strategic Myth (New York, Routledge, 2012);
Benno Gerhard Teschke, “Fatal Attraction: A Critique of Carl Schmitt’s International Political and Legal Theory,”
International Theory 3 (2011): 179-227. Morgenthau, another German Jewish émigré, had a similar understanding
of anthropology and international relations to Herz, but believed that, based on man’s inherently violent nature, a
peaceful world order free of war was impossible, and that international relations would be inevitably plagued by
conflict and confrontation. See Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific Man Versus Power Politics (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1946); Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1948); Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1951).
For secondary literature on Morgenthau, see see William E. Scheuermann, Morgenthau (New York: Polity, 2008);
Michaela Neacsu, Hans J. Morgenthau’s Theory of International Relations: Disenchantment and Re-Enchantment
(New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2010); Michael C. Williams, Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans
Morgenthau in International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
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three moves beyond Loewenstein, focusing instead on Herz, and examines the relationship
between the two scholars, and how Herz, despite his similar biography and worldview,
developed a markedly different solution to the dilemma facing democracy. Finally, the
conclusion reflects on the position of militant democracy today, and how Loewenstein and
Herz’s worldviews evolved in the decades following World War II. While Herz remained
optimistic, Loewenstein, despite the emergence of a democratic Germany, remained pessimistic
until the end of his days.

12

Chapter One
The Academic: Karl Loewenstein and the
Development of Militant Democracy

“If democracy is convinced that it has not yet fulfilled
its destination, it must fight on its own plane a technique
which serves only the purpose of power. Democracy must
become militant.”21

Karl Loewenstein was born in Munich, Germany in 1891 to a family of wealthy Jewish
Bavarian industrialists, and traveled extensively during his childhood, including time spent living
in England and South America.22 After several years at universities in Munich, Heidelberg –
where he studied under Max Weber – Paris and Berlin, he received a law degree in 1914. During
World War I he spent 1915 serving with the German infantry,23 and was admitted into the
German bar in 1918.24 A year later Loewenstein received his doctorate in civil and ecclesiastical

21

Karl Loewenstein, “Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, I”, The American Political Science
Review 3 (1937): 419.
22

To this point, no comprehensive biography of Loewenstein has been published in English. While Lang’s
biography, Transatlantischer Denker der Politik does provide an in-depth overview of Loewenstein’s formative
years, it has yet to be translated.
23

Unfortunately little information is available about Loewenstein’s war service.

24

R. W. Kostal, “The Alchemy of Occupation: Karl Loewenstein and the Legal Reconstruction of Nazi
Germany, 1945-1946,” Law and History Review 29 (2011): 3-4.
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law at Munich.25 After practicing law throughout the 1920s in and around Munich, Loewenstein
entered academia and became a lecturer at the University of Munich School of Law in 1931. He
was forced to resign this position in 1933 as a consequence of the Nazi’s efforts to purge nonAryans from public service, and shortly thereafter left Germany for the United States. While in
America, with the help of the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced German Scholars,
Loewenstein secured a two-year teaching position at Yale University in 1935, and in 1936
accepted a permanent position teaching political science at Amherst College.
**
During this period, shortly after immigrating to the United States, Karl Loewenstein
began writing academic articles about the spread of fascism, and, in particular, what steps the
remaining western democracies should undertake to protect themselves from internal fascists
threats.26 These articles provide much of the basis for the future importance of Loewenstein’s
work, and show a clear progression of thought that mirrors European political developments
throughout the 1930s. In the first of these articles, “Autocracy Versus Democracy in
Contemporary Europe I and II,” published in The American Political Science Review in 1935,
Loewenstein examines the political makeup of Europe, as well as the prospect of the remaining
democratic nations of succumbing to internal fascist movements. Within this analysis, he first
describes what he later terms militant democracy, the idea that democratic nations must
proactively defend themselves against fascism, as fascists are all too capable of utilizing
democratic principles to enable their ascent to power. No longer are these principles alone

25

Joseph Bendersky, “Carl Schmitt,’s Path to Nuremburg: A Sixty-Year Assessment,” TELOS 139 (2007):

10.
26

Markus Lang, “Karl Loewenstein: From Public Law to Political Science,” in German Scholars in Exile:
New Studies in Intellectual History, ed. Axel Fair-Schulz et al (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2011), 36.
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sufficient to protect the state – rather, these principles, and in particular the democratic belief in
fundamental rights, in many ways enable the fascists to succeed.
Loewenstein continued his inquiry into the conflict between democracy and fascism in a
pair of 1937 articles, “Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights I and II,” again published in
The American Political Science Review. These two articles continue his examination of fascism,
while investigating the similarities between European fascists movements, and the steps these
movements undertook to transition from the political fringe to the sole governmental authority
within a state. Loewenstein also continues to outline possible steps that democratic nations must
take to resist the spread of fascism, including what antifascist legislation has already been
enacted by democratic states, and how these laws, which are examples of militant democracy in
action, work to protect the democratic state.
Although much of the content of this article is similar to the earlier “Autocracy Versus
Democracy I and II,” Loewenstein’s tone throughout is noticeably more alarmist. As he has
witnessed the progressive spread and success of fascism throughout Europe, his hope for the
continued existence of democratic states has waned. Further, the steps outlined by Loewenstein
in “Militant Democracy” are a temporary abandonment of many of the principles and rights held
most dear to democratic nations – an abandonment, that, in Loewenstein’s eyes, is necessary for
the defense of democracy in the long term. This abandonment, forced upon democratic nations
by the unique nature of the fascist threat, is one of the most fascinating elements of
Loewenstein’s work during this period, and reflects both his pessimism – rooted in his recent in
his recent immigration – as well as his growing anxiety about fascism.
Loewenstein continues this argument in his next pair of articles, “Legislative Control of
Extremism in European Democracies I and II,” published in Columbia Law Review in 1938.
Similar to “Militant Democracy,” in these articles Loewenstein surveys existing anti-fascist
15

legislation, and, in technical legal language appropriate for a law journal, analyzes the way in
which these laws effectively deprive fascist groups of the tools necessary to seize power from the
existing democratic system. Even when writing in such a legalistic context, Loewenstein cannot
help but reaffirm the pessimistic way in which he views the prospects of the democratic states, as
well as reveal his continued anxiety about the threat posed by fascism to the west. Even here he
presents the conflict between fascism and democracy as a war, arguing that everything possible
must be done to protect democratic institutions, no matter the cost.
Loewenstein published another article in 1938 on militant democracy, “The Balance of
Legislative and Executive Power: A Study in Comparative Constitutional Law,” in The
University of Chicago Law Review. Importantly, in this article, Loewenstein expands on his
original theory of militant democracy, and argues for the necessity of implementing fundamental
changes to the political process of the United States in order create a smaller and more
responsive legislature better able to cope with the demands of a modern state, along with a more
powerful, active executive. Unlike the temporary antifascist legislation, these proposed changes
would be permanent, and represent a radicalization of Loewenstein’s thought, as well as the
evolution of a second level to his theory of militant democracy, encompassing both temporary
and permanent measures.
Examining Loewenstein’s articles during this period reveals the growing alarm with
which Loewenstein describes the spread of fascism, transforming the dry, academic examination
of fascism as a new political movement in 1935 into the panic of the late 1930s. Loewenstein
believed that if radical steps were not taken, then the remaining democratic nations, including the
United States, would fall to internal subversive fascist elements. This mounting anxiety reveals a
fundamental change in Loewenstein’s outlook. He became, like so many other Jewish
intellectuals who were forced to flee Germany after the Nazi Party seized power in 1933, a
16

pessimist. He was no longer content to simply hope that democratic principles, human nature and
inevitable progress were safeguards against the darker forces of humanity embodied by fascism.
Instead, democratic nations must participate in an active fight against fascism, taking whatever
steps are necessary in order to prevent their internal destruction at the hands of fascist agitators.
**
Loewenstein’s first examination of fascism and the prospects of its further spread
throughout Europe can be found in “Autocracy Versus Democracy in Cotemporary Europe I and
II,” published in 1935. These articles are the beginning of a new era in Loewenstein’s research
and writing. The tone that Loewenstein takes throughout these article – that of an objective
academic investigating a new political development – and the way he describes fascism are
significant, and stand in contrast to his later works, where his personal involvement in the
protection of democracy and his anxiety are much clearer. Beyond showing the development of
his theory of militant democracy, “Autocracy Versus Democracy I and II” show the beginning of
Loewenstein’s transformation from academic to advocate.
Loewenstein’s work here is a reflection of the political climate of Europe in the early to
mid 1930s. Between 1933, when Loewenstein fled from Germany, and 1935, when he published
“Autocracy Versus Democracy I and II,” Germany had reemerged as one of the Great Powers on
the European continent, while the European democracies, suffering through the Great
Depression, became increasingly unstable. Hitler, by pursuing an aggressive foreign policy that
took advantage of the worsening relationship between England and France, was able to press
Germany’s diplomatic position, forcing concessions from England and France on provisions
from the Treaty of Versailles. Simultaneously, while fascist Germany prospered, the political
power of France waned. Beset by serious internal strife and economic turmoil, French politics
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throughout the 1930s was increasingly dominated by the radicalized elements of the far left and
far right, with the possibility of outright revolution by either group festering just below the
surface.27
The position of the smaller democratic powers in Europe was particularly treacherous.
Faced with the decline of France and the reemergence of Germany, these small powers –
including Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Poland and the Baltic States – were forced to contend with
an evolving international political landscape as well as internal unrest at the hands of the
unemployed and dissatisfied who looked to Germany and Russia for an example of the proper
response to the Depression.28 Read within the context of the unstable political landscape,
Loewenstein’s analysis becomes more meaningful, as well as a clear response to the new reality
of European politics in 1935.
Loewenstein begins by summarizing the “political scene of contemporary Europe,”
pointing out that the European states, “are aligned in two fundamentally antagonistic camps,”
democracy and liberalism, and autocracy.29 Loewenstein believes that Great Britain, the Irish
Free State, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Switzerland
and Czechoslovakia fall into the former category, while Russia, Turkey, Germany, Italy,
Portugal, Austria, Poland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Estonia and Latvia
compromise the latter.30 According to Loewenstein, in 1935 “by far the greater part of European
territory and of European population is under dictatorial rule of one type or another,” and, facing
27

Raymond J. Sontag, A Broken World: 1919 – 1939 (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 279. See also Kent
Forster, Recent Europe: A Twentieth Century History (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1965) for another
general overview of the European political climate during this period.
28

Sontag, Broken World, 269-271.

29

Karl Loewenstein, “Autocracy Versus Democracy in Contemporary Europe, I,” The American Political
Science Review 29 (1935): 571.
30

Loewenstein, “Autocracy Versus Democracy I,” 571.

18

this reality, it is necessary to examine the prospects of the remaining democratic nations for
becoming autocratic dictatorships.31
Before undertaking this examination, Loewenstein briefly reviews the political history of
democratic and autocratic forms of government, taking pains to point out that “the rationalization
of government by the devices of free self-expression called democracy is a comparatively new
phenomenon,” and that for the large part of human history man has lived under autocratic
systems.32 Beyond the accuracy of this assertion, which functions to dispel much of the surprise
surrounding the spread of dictatorships, as in many ways this spread can be seen as simply
reverting to the mean, Loewenstein’s comments here do much to reveal the tone he takes
throughout the article. At this stage Loewenstein is still attempting to approach his subject with
an element of academic objectivity and distance. It is unclear at this point how he personally
feels about autocracy, and in particular fascism, and what greater meaning he attaches to the
prospect of the further spread of autocracy throughout the remaining democratic European
nations. This attempt at objectivity is further evident in Loewenstein’s acknowledgement of the
unique nature of this spread of autocratic governments. While “to the observer of history,” the
reemergence of “Caesarism” is not surprising, the speed by which “the new dictatorial wave” has
spread is unique, and prompts “deep concern to everybody who values democracy as a higher
step of mankind toward progress and civilization.”33 By writing as such, Loewenstein is
couching his analysis. For those who believe that democracy is the next step in mankind’s march
of progress, fascism is a threat; but this belief is neither universally held nor necessarily correct.

31

Loewenstein, “Autocracy Versus Democracy I,” 571.

32

Loewenstein, “Autocracy Versus Democracy I,” 572.

33

Loewenstein, “Autocracy Versus Democracy I,” 573.

19

Importantly, in this first section, and in line with the title of the article, Loewenstein
contrasts democracy and autocracy in general, and places both Russia and Germany, despite their
opposing worldviews, within the autocratic category. Lowenstein acknowledges this relationship
early on, pointing out that his use of autocracy as a descriptive term “embraces not only the
fascist variety as presented by Italy and Germany, but also the communistic form of dictatorship
in Russia.”34 This distinction is significant, as for the majority of his following articles, and, in
fact, most of “Autocracy Versus Democracy,” he almost exclusively discusses the prospect of
the continued spread of fascism, ignoring the obvious parallels between Russia and Germany,
and the crimes of Stalin and Hitler.
**
After briefly outlining the historical background of fascism, Loewenstein begins his
analysis of the odds of the remaining democratic European nations for becoming fascist.35
Loewenstein first attempts to “distinguish between the general tendencies of the replacement of
democratic by autocratic rule and the specific conditions arising from the economic and political
situation of a given country.”36 Loewenstein here is presenting the adoption of fascism as the
consequence of two diverse factors: those that are general and exist regardless of particular
circumstance, and those that are the direct result of the Great Depression and economic unrest.
In general, much of fascism’s appeal comes from fulfilling what Loewenstein terms “the
missionary spirit,” or the “individual’s obsession by belief in the absolute and indisputable value
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of his own devotion to a new basic principle of life,” which causes him to preach this ideology at
every turn.37 The proponents of this new ideology act as missionaries, spreading the doctrine of
fascism like a religion. This spread is further facilitated by local concepts of nationalism and
regionalism, as within these beliefs fascism can be seen as a unifying ideology to help reunite
populations that have been previously separated.
As to the particular, the appeal of fascism reflects the generally held belief that economic
change requires a change in government. For populaces suffering under the spreading worldwide
Great Depression, “national economic autarchy has become the catchword of the day,” which
can only be achieved by an active government that interferes with the economy.38 This, in turn,
necessitates an organized, centralized authority unfetered by private interests, and logically, the
concentration of “political power in the hands of a government strong enough to cope with the
obstacles during the transition period [from unplanned to planned economy].”39 Facing this
crisis, “dictation from above becomes necessary, even where the spirit of the nation abhors
compulsory methods of suppression of free institutions.”40 Thus, fascism is seen as the solution
to economic depression, and the poorer the economic situation in a particular nation, the greater
the prospects for this nation adopting fascism.
Beyond the two different motivations leading to the support of fascism, democracy in
Europe is further threatened by the “facilities afforded by the fascist technique,” namely the
encouragement of apathy and silence, which causes citizens who recognize the threat to do
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nothing.41 This encouragement in many way stems from what Lowenstein describes as the
“science” of introducing fascism into a democratic state, which is a “typical procedure applicable
to almost any state under the rule of democracy.”42 To Loewenstein, this science is a
“rationalized and pre-calculated routine progressing, step by step, on the basis of experience and
precedent,” and is aided by democracy itself.43 Although not fully explained, what Loewenstein
is claiming is that the institutions of democracy provide fascism with the tools needed for the
destruction of the existing government.44
This passage is, for several reasons, one of the most important of the article.
Loewenstein’s description of the way in which fascism actually utilizes the democratic process
to destroy democracy itself is important. While he is by no means the first scholar to highlight
the problems of relying on democratic ideals alone to protect the democratic state, he is one of
the first to propose the solution that is first alluded to in “Autocracy Versus Democracy.” This
passage is the beginning of what eventually will evolve in later articles into his theory of militant
democracy. As he succinctly summarizes, in many fascist states, “the democratic constitution
became the main obstacle against [the state’s] maintenance and the best tool for its
destruction.”45
According to Loewenstein, this phenomenon can be readily observed in the
circumstances surrounding Hitler’s rise to power in Germany. While much of Hitler’s appeal
came from his ability to tap into the public’s anger with the Treaty of Versailles and the other
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Western powers, he would have never been able to assume power (or even rise beyond a petty
demagogue) without being enabled by the “generous and lenient Weimar republic,” which
fashioned the mechanisms for its own doom by allowing “the existence of a resolute competition
to the legal authority of the state.”46 For Loewenstein, the Weimar government was destined to
failure “from the beginning... because it was pacifist47 instead of militant.”48 Here, again, the
seeds (and even language) of his later writings can be observed, and by providing concrete
evidence of the validity of his analysis, Loewenstein makes the threat posed by fascism to
democracies seem all the more acute. If democratic governments wait until the fascists have
begun to implement their scientific process, it is too late. The defensive measures must be
undertaken proactively, and long before the fascist party prepares to assume power.
After reviewing the actual process by which a fascist government subverts a democratic
state, Loewenstein begins his specific examination of the prospects of each remaining
democratic nation for becoming fascist in “Autocracy Versus Democracy in Central Europe, II,”
again published in in the American Political Science Review in 1935. For the purposes of this
thesis, the importance of these predictions lies in what they reveal about Loewenstein’s
understanding of fascism and his worldview in 1935, and not in their eventual accuracy, as eerily
prescient as they may be. Much of Loewenstein’s analysis here rests on his contention that,
beyond economic prosperity, the single most important factor in determining a nation’s ability to
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resist fascism is its tradition of democracy.49 If “self-government and democracy is lacking [the
nation is] more susceptible to fascist propaganda and therefore more exposed to surreptitious
change of government.”50
Loewenstein begins with the Balkan states, for which he does not have high hopes of a
continued relationship with democratic principles. He has particular reservations about Rumania,
which can be seen as more an “autocracy than as a constitutional state,” as while the 1923
Rumanian constitution describes the Rumanian government as a constitutional monarchy, in
reality the state is run by a government class composed of traditional aristocrats and wealthy
landowners, who make up almost all members of the parliament.51 A similar system can be
found in Yugoslavia and Hungary, and while early fascist efforts in Bulgaria (supported by
German money) have not been particularly successful up until 1934, the growing popularity of
anti-Semitic and racist rhetoric among Bulgarian leaders does not bode well for the nation’s
continued resistance to fascism.52
Of note is the importance of anti-Semitism53 to the acceptability of fascism implied by
Loewenstein here – to him, fascism benefits from a popular acceptance of anti-Semitic beliefs, as
this acceptance can serve as a rallying cry for a dispirited population, with Jews functioning as
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an easy scapegoat for fascist rhetoric. In Bulgaria, with a long tradition of “popular animosity
towards Jews,” especially among the rural population, anti-Semitism could serve as a wedge by
which fascism could conceivably force itself into the Bulgarian government, and could prove
more powerful than the nation’s legacy of constitutional monarchy.54
Loewenstein next examines Greece. Following a period of turmoil, a democratic
constitution was established in 1927, and a period of peace lasted until 1935, when tensions
between the two political parties spilled into the streets, and the Venizelists attempted to
overthrow the Tsaldaris government.55 Faced with a “resolute government in command of the
ordinary military powers,” this attempt failed, and prompted constitutional reform that helped
further concentrate power in the hands of the government party.56 While at first glance this
successful resistance would be a promising sign for continued democracy in Greece, the
subsequent concentration of power, and the actions that prompted this concentration, have
followed “the beaten track of quasi-fascist methods,” which so often end in full blown fascism.
Further, Loewenstein views recent agitation by Greeks for a reestablishment of the traditional
monarchy as nothing more than an attempt to implement a “veiled form of autocratic rule.”57
Thus, Greece is yet another example of a country that has poor prospects for resisting
fascism. Interestingly, the path followed by the Greek government in instituting constitutional
reforms to help resist internal disorder is similar in some ways to Loewenstein’s own idea of
militant democracy – a proactive attempt by a sitting democratic government to head off
emerging threats. Clearly such an attempt carries with it an implicit danger of enabling the ruling
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party to entrench themselves within a state, and while Loewenstein never articulates this
concern, it is important to bear in mind as he further develops his theory for the defense of
democracy.58
Loewenstein views Spain’s prospects in a similar light. Like Germany, during the 1920s
Spain “failed to build up a strong middle-class party holding the balance between right and left,”
leading to an ill-timed revolt by the leftist parties against the state and military.59 With little
prospect of succeeding, this revolt will serve as a pretext for the Spanish right to further entrench
themselves in power, using the “menace of dictatorship of the proletariat... for the organization
of a ruthless white terror preparing the way for the establishment of fascist or authoritarian
rule.”60 In this prediction, Loewenstein sees a similarity to the destruction of the Weimar state,
wherein the tension (and open conflict) between the left and the right has provided enough
“hatred to bid for a ferocious application of the fascist suppression.”61
Loewenstein finds Czechoslovakia to be an especially interesting case. Democracy has
functioned well under the benevolent leadership of President Masaryk, demonstrating what
Loewenstein terms the “vitality of the democratic idea” – a phrase that seems to hint at his true
feelings towards his subject matter. Further, Czechoslovakia is one of the few nations to actively
implement prohibitions on fascist activity, especially of Nazi sympathizers, thereby fulfilling
some of the precepts of Loewenstein’s prescribed defense of democracy. Yet, despite these
positive signs, the continued agitation of Germany for recognition of German nationals, and the
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growing support these nationals have found within Czechoslovakia, does not bode well for the
future of the state.
Although never explicitly mentioned, Loewenstein here seems to be admitting that even
an active defense against fascism may not be sufficient to protect the democratic institutions of a
state. Such an acknowledgement seems to cast doubt on Loewenstein’s entire theory of militant
democracy – as well as further emphasizes the threat posed by fascism. Unsurprisingly,
Loewenstein does not elaborate on this subject, and as he continues to write on this topic
throughout the 1930s, he presents his theory of militant democracy as a thoroughly effective tool
for preserving a democratic state.
Loewenstein holds out high hopes for the Scandinavian states. Although Germany has
spent considerable time and money attempting to develop fascist parties in Sweden, Finland and
Denmark, none of these parties have taken hold among the citizenry.62 With a politically
educated population well versed in democracy, as well as surprisingly resilient economies that
have to this point shown little signs of depression, there is almost no prospect of any of these
countries of becoming fascist.63 Sweden, in particular, can be seen as one of the strongest
democracies in Europe due to its proactive defense against militarism and fascism. In 1933 and
1934 Sweden’s parliament “used their [powers] to enact the necessary legislation against the
fascist propaganda,” outlawing uniforms, badges and other insignias of party allegiance.64 Even
in Finland, where an extremist right wing has found some popularity, the presence of a strong
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middle class acts as a countervailing political force, ensuring that these extremists will never find
a popular audience for their rhetoric.65
Like the Scandinavian States, Belgium has few prospects of becoming fascist, unless
France, Belgium’s closest ally (and national home to many of its citizens) were to fall to fascism.
With a tradition of democracy, and a responsive, “elastic” parliamentary system, Belgium has
reacted well to the Great Depression.66 While discussing Belgium, Loewenstein makes his first
reference to the United States, commenting that, faced with economic instability, Belgium, like
the United States, delegated “vast [economic] powers to the government for a given period.”67
Loewenstein here is alluding to the election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and Roosevelt’s and
the American Congress’ quick approval of government programs to shore up the economy, and
is thus implying that America, like Belgium, has the necessary flexibility to resist a fascist threat.
Moving on to Switzerland, Loewenstein predicts that, despite a vocal fascist movement,
“Swiss fascism has already reached its climax.”68 Lacking a charismatic, first-rate leader, and
confronted by the “institutions of free self-government,” the Swiss fascist parties are beginning
to dissolve.69 Unfortunately, despite these positive developments, the Swiss tradition of resolving
important questions by public referendum may be the nation’s undoing, as fascists have proven
to be particularly effective at winning popular votes through coercive techniques.70 This
prediction is consistent with Loewenstein’s earlier, insightful observation of the unique way in
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which democratic institutions, acting with good intentions, may actually enable fascism to
succeed.
Loewenstein next turns to France, the “unknown x in the political equation of Europe”
that is “the critical point in the battle waging between dictatorial and democratic rule.”71 Since
1870 France has become increasingly democratic, and the French people, buoyed by an educated
middle class, “are still imbued with the traditional ideology of liberalism and deeply conscious of
the shortcomings of the communist and fascist paradises.”72 Unfortunately, despite this
appreciation for democratic ideals, France throughout the 1930s has been wracked by political
and parliamentary instability, and “scandals of far-reaching consequence.”73 Here, Loewenstein
is clearly referring to the Stavisky Affair, and the procession of discredited and unpopular
governments that followed.
In December 1933, an investigation into failed pawnshops in Bayonne, France, revealed
an extensive bond-selling scheme overseen by Serge Alexandre Stavisky, a Russian born Jew.74
Faced with imminent arrest, Stavisky fled to Switzerland, where he was cornered by French
police, and committed suicide.75 Throughout January and February 1934 the far right French
press presented the suicide as a murder intended to cover up Stavisky’s ties to powerful French
politicians, forcing the resignation of premier Camille Chautemps, who was replaced by Edouard
Daladier. Dalaider immediately acted to remove the conservative prefect of the Paris police, Jean
Chiappe, prompting a series of demonstrations and riots that came to a head on February 6, 1934,
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when far right protestors engaged in open street fighting with elements of the French left and
police forces.76 In the aftermath of the riots, Daladier resigned, inaugurating several years of
constant political unrest and turmoil, and reinforcing the belief of a large portion of the French
populace that their government was unalterably corrupt.77
These scandals, as well as a poorly written constitution that provides no protections for
democracy itself, has left France “in permanent danger of a revolution.”78 Beyond the
consequences of a populous, economically viable nation falling to fascism, France’s fate is in
particular tied to the fate of Europe at large. France, allied with England, acts as the continental
anchor of the Great Power alliance that defeated Germany in World War I and has attempted to
govern European affairs since. Unfortunately, with a low birth rate and a population decimated
by trench warfare, France is unable to bear this burden, and is, “in the position of an elderly man
who undertakes a mountaineering excursion far beyond his real strength, but keeps up the
appearance of enjoying it.”79 This need to maintain appearances only further exacerbates the
domestic unrest, and France is at a crisis point, after which the existing state of affairs can no
longer continue. The most obvious manifestation of this crisis is the growing presence of militant
forces of the right and left. These forces showcase a special dilemma within France: any sign of
upheaval may tip the nation over the brink into civil war, as both leftist and rightist groups are
waiting for a sign of provocation to again spill into the streets.80 Loewenstein fears that in
France, just as in Spain, the unstable situation may necessitate the application of “fascist
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methods” by the French ministries such as “martial rule and the suppression of the civil rights to
cope with a disturbance of order and safety,” thereby paving the way for a fascist takeover.81
In contrast to the instability of France, Great Britain stands as one of the lynchpins of
democracy in Europe, and can be considered immune from fascism.82 Although Great Britain has
suffered under the Great Depression, the fact that the populace has a “time-honored acceptance
of democratic ideals and institutions,” as well as a tradition of compromise and free debate,
guarantees that England will easily resist fascist pressure.83 Britain’s democratic tradition has
proven so strong that the House of Commons has thus far declined to take legislative (or military
democratic) steps to prohibit the display of private military uniforms, believing that such steps
are unnecessary in the face of the widespread support for the sitting government.84
Loewenstein also briefly reviews the prospects for the rise of fascism in America. At this
point, Loewenstein believes that
[America is] so remote from the European experience in fascism and the ideology of fascism
is so alien to America thought, nourished by British traditions of self-government over a long
period, that it seems unreasonable to expect the appearance or growth of any brand of European
fascism. The effort of some irresponsible elements – adventurers or idealists – to import the
European brand of fascism and dictatorship seems hopeless.85

Despite this hopeful assessment, Loewenstein adds a cautionary note, warning that “confidence
in the superiority of democratic institutions and belief in the soundness and reasonableness of the
masses do by no means suffice to safeguard the existing order.”86 If the American economy
continues to struggle, and fails to absorb the large masses of unemployed, America could, at
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some later point, conceivably see the growth of a national fascist movement.87 Even the nations
with the strongest democratic traditions, and populations whose traditions run counter to fascist
ideology, still harbor the potential to cultivate a fascist movement. No country is entirely safe.
**
Overall, Loewenstein does not hold high hopes for the future of democracy in Europe.
Beyond a few nations with a long tradition of democratic rule – most notably England and
America – virtually every nation is susceptible to an internal fascist takeover. While this
pessimistic analysis is to some extent the result of Loewenstein’s own personal experiences with
fascism, in many ways it is completely in line with Loewenstein’s own explanation for the
success of fascism, and his criteria for the susceptibility of a nation to fascist takeover. The
majority of nations with a poor prospect for continued democracy are in the grips of economic
turmoil and depression, have no tradition of democracy, and have populations that possess longheld discriminatory beliefs, especially anti-Semitism.
Yet, despite his gloomy outlook, Loewenstein at this point still approaches the subject of
fascism through an attempt at academic objectivity. In 1935, his pessimism has not become full
blown, and he still harbors hope that some nations will be able to resist the fascist allure. Even if
this is not the case and fascism conquers the whole of Europe, as he points out early in
“Autocracy Versus Democracy I,” this change could simply be the next step in the evolution of
political systems throughout Europe, and is a natural consequence of the changing worldview of
the west throughout the twentieth century. In short, it is possible that the intellectual sun has set
on democracy, and, just as with earlier, discredited, political beliefs, it is time for a new system
to fill the vacuum. Further, he gives no hint that the United States is at any risk of falling to
fascism. Even though by 1935 the American economy had collapsed, setting into motion
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spiraling unemployment, Loewenstein sees virtually no chance of fascism taking root in
America.
**
Loewenstein followed up “Autocracy Versus Democracy in Central Europe, I and II”
with two more articles about how democratic governments could resist fascist overthrow,
“Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, I and II,” published in 1937. Just as with
“Autocracy Versus Democracy,” “Militant Democracy I and II” must be examined within the
context of the continuing political developments in Europe.88 During the two years between the
articles, the position of democracy has declined throughout Europe. In 1935 fascist Italy invaded
and conquered Ethiopia, one of the few remaining independent African nations, and in 1936
Hitler successfully remilitarized the Rhineland, which had previously been demilitarized in
accordance with the Treaty of Versailles, as well as concluded a treaty with Italy, creating the
Axis alliance that would serve as the backbone of a new fascist and authoritarian alliance
structure throughout Europe. While the fascist nations prospered, and Germany continued its
rapid rearmament and economic transformation, the remaining democratic powers suffered under
the economic deprivations of the Great Depression, as well as an increasingly radicalized and
divisive political climate. In 1936 the Spanish Civil War broke out between the rightist General
Franco, supported by Germany and Italy, and the leftist Nationalist groups, loyal to the Spanish
republic, leading to a brutal multi-year conflict.
In “Militant Democracy I and II,” Loewenstein fully realizes his theory of militant
democracy, and is able, with examples of existing legislation, to articulate how a democratic
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nation can, through legislative measures, protect itself from the scientific methods of fascism
described in “Autocracy Versus Democracy.” Loewenstein’s tone in these articles is markedly
different than his earlier work. Compared to 1935, he has become more personally invested in
defending democracy, is much more anxious about the threat posed by fascism to the west, and is
one step further along in his transition from academic to advocate.
Loewenstein begins “Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, I” by briefly
summarizing what fascism is and the development of the historical growth of the facist political
movement, which has “developed into a universal movement which in its seemingly irresistible
surge is comparable to the rising of European liberalism.”89 While this section is similar to
“Autocracy Versus Democracy,” of note is his distinction between constitutionalism, which
“guarantees rationality and calculability of administration while preserving a definite sphere of
private law and fundamental rights,” and fascism, which has “substitution [of] the rule of law
[for] legalized opportunism.”90 This distinction is at odds with his earlier description of fascism
as a science, which reflects his growing involvement in the conflict between fascism and
democracy, and the fervor with which he believes fascism must be stopped.
Loewenstein’s feelings towards fascism are also shown in his description of a “fascist
International of the multi-colored shirts… transcending national borders and cutting deeply
across historical diversities of traditionally disjoined nationalisms.”91 By describing a linked
worldwide network of fascist states and suggesting that no differences truly exist between the
fascist regimes in Italy, Germany and Spain, Loewenstein is revealing his growing anxiety. He
believes that fascism is a united, encroaching worldwide conspiracy that threatens the few
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remaining democratic nations. According to Loewenstein, further evidence of the existence of
this conspiracy can seen in in the leaders of the fascist nations, as they show a “similarity of…
personalities.”92
After this brief overview, Loewenstein begins his analysis of how democratic nations fall
to fascism, and how this process can be prevented by legislative and legal means. Loewenstein
first describes this idea, termed militant democracy, by arguing that if democracy wishes to
continue as a relevant and existent political mode, and is “not convinced that it has not yet
fulfilled its destination, it must fight on its own plane a technique which serves only the purposes
of power. Democracy must become militant.”93 Loewenstein devotes the rest of “Militant
Democracy I,” and all of “Militant Democracy II,” to describing this technique, which is the
basis of much of his later relevance as a political theorist, and is clear evidence of his growing
advocacy for democracy, as well as his mounting personal stake in the defense of democratic
institutions.
For Loewenstein, much of fascism’s success has been “based on its perfect adjustment to
democracy,” thus allowing, as he first pointed out in “Autocracy Versus Democracy,” the use of
democratic institutions for their own destruction. Key to this destruction is the understanding by
fascists that “democracy could not, without self-abnegation, deny to any body of public opinion
the full use of the free institutions of speech, press, assembly, and parliamentary participation.”94
Fascists use these institutions for their own gain, working to “systematically discredit the
democratic order and make it unworkable by paralyzing its functions until chaos reigns.”95 They
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then seize on this deadlock as justification for their own alternative program, and are able,
through effective propaganda and emotional appeal, to garner widespread public support for a
proposed solution to a problem originally of their own making. In short, “the mechanism of
democracy is the Trojan horse by which the enemy enters the city,” and fascists have slipped into
power while democratic fundamentalists have sat idly by, naively hoping that democratic
principles themselves would protect the existing order.96
The only solution to this threat is for democracy to take steps to actively defend itself.
Fascism can only “be defeated… on its own plane and by its own devices, [and] mere
acquiescence and optimistic belief in ultimate victory of the spirit over force only encourages
fascism without stabilizing democracy.”97 Thus, democracies must take legal steps to limit the
institutions that fascism exploits, namely freedom of speech and press, two rights that
Loewenstein terms fundamental.98 By denying fascists these rights, democracies are able to
proactively remove their opponents’ best tools for raising popular support, thereby guaranteeing
that fascists will never have the popularity to attempt a takeover, through legal means or
otherwise. While proponents of democracy have long been hesitant to interfere with freedom of
speech, Loewenstein believes that, faced with the reality of fascism’s success throughout Europe,
“legalistic self-complacency and suicidal lethargy [is giving] way to a better grasp of realities.”99
This idea is the key to Loewenstein’s theory of militant democracy, and is, in many ways,
the fundamental explanation for both the rest of his academic work, as well as his public efforts,
over the next decade. Unlike in “Autocracy Versus Democracy,” Loewenstein now has a
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solution to the threat posed by fascism. By restricting the democratic institutions that fascism
uses to such great effect, fascists will be deprived of the necessary means to gain power, and thus
will never pose a threat in the first place.100 By preemptively heading off fascism before fascists
gather enough power to attempt a takeover, or force the issue during an emergency, democracy
can proactively guarantee its continued security.101
An example of this style legislation can be seen in a law passed in March 1937 by the
Belgian parliament to “prevent resignation from parliamentary seats merely for the sake of
facilitating propaganda at the ensuing by-elections.”102 The passage of this law, which acts to
limit the freedom of elected officials in hopes of depriving fascists with a useful propaganda tool,
is a “clear indication of the growing unwilling[ness] of democracies to lend parliamentary
institutions to the fascist technique of exploiting them for selfish ends.”103
Loewenstein’s language and tone here are of particular interest. Throughout his
description of militant democracy, and his defense of its principles, Loewenstein repeatedly
employs martial language and metaphors. To him, the current conflict between fascism and
democracy is similar to the conflict between democracy and the needs of a mobilized state seen
during World War I, and there “democracies withstood the ordeal of the World War much better
than did autocratic states – by adopting autocratic methods.”104 As in recent wartime, when “few
objected to the temporary suspension of constitutional principles for the sake of national selfdefense,” defenders of democracy should understand the immediate need to abandon some of
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their principles in the short term. Europe is under “a virtual state of siege,” and “during war…
legality takes a vacation.”105
The effect of Loewenstein’s language here is twofold. First, it reveals the extent to which
he has become personally involved in this war – the conflict between autocracy and democracy
is not, as in 1935, a subject viewed with academic detachment. Now, instead, it is a cause to
agitate for, and defeating fascism is a battle cry to which Loewenstein himself is rallying. It
would not be an exaggeration to go so far as to describe his language here as verging on the
hysteric. By describing Europe in these terms, Loewenstein is also revealing his own
increasingly pessimistic worldview. To him, Europe is on the brink, and the most extreme
measures (“every possible effort”) must be undertaken to prevent it from tumbling over the edge
and into the chaos of fascism.106 At this point, there is no question of how Loewenstein views his
subject matter: he wants democracy to continue, and, in the defense of democracy, the ends
justify the means.
Second, by using military language to describe the European political situation, and
exaggerating the threat to the European democracies – only two years earlier England was
described as immune to fascism – Loewenstein is using fascism’s own appeal to drum up support
for militant democracy. As he has discussed repeatedly, fascism is grounded in emotion, and
fascist parties make great use of the emergency situation, frequently using expediency as a
justification for a quick transition to a fascist government. Loewenstein is essentially (and
ironically) performing the same act. To him, the threat to democracy is so dire, and so apparent,
that actions must immediately be taken – democracy “must live up to the demands of the
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hour.”107 Such an appeal is the essence of emotionalism. Just as the fascists use the threat of
economic depression to mobilize a population, Loewenstein is attempting to use fascism to
mobilize a government. To him, democratic governments must immediately follow the course
laid out by him or risk destruction. There is something fundamentally different from simply
proscribing the means by which a democratic government can protect itself from fascism, and
casting the conflict between democracy and fascism as an apocalyptic and historic clash of
worldviews. The fact that Loewenstein is doing the latter is significant, and has up until this
point been glossed over by scholars working with his theories. Further, the stark differences
between “Militant Democracy I” and “Autocracy Versus Democracy” are obvious, and show his
increasingly pessimistic worldview, his growing personal involvement in the defense of
democracy, his mounting anxiety, and his ongoing transition from academic to advocate.
**
Loewenstein continues his discussion of militant democracy in his next article, “Militant
Democracy and Fundamental Rights II.” Here he surveys specific European legislation that
demonstrates the effectiveness of his earlier general arguments on what democracies must do to
defend themselves against fascism. The countries covered by Loewenstein in this article include
France, Belgium, the Netherlands, England, the Irish Free State, Sweden, Norway, Denmark,
Finland, Switzerland and Czechoslovakia – a list that for all intents and purposes contains all of
the remaining democratic nations left in Europe.108
Loewenstein categorizes anti-fascist legislation into fourteen different types, all of which,
despite local or national differences, display “considerable uniformity... corresponding to the
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uniformity of the fascist technique undermining the democratic technique.”109 The most
successful of these legislations are those enacted quickly, as “unduly delayed legislation [have]
found it increasingly difficult to quell movements that had already cast their spell and taken root
in the public attention.”110
The first type of legislation is those laws meant to deal with “open rebellion, insurrection,
armed uprising,” and other types of open conflict between fascists and the democratic
government.111 While in most cases open rebellion can be easily be dealt with by a nation’s
existing police and military forces, Switzerland (1934, 1936), Czechoslovakia (1923) and
Belgium (1934) have “strengthen[ed] their political codes or… [introduced] special legislation
against high treason” to head off the threat from a fascist uprising.112 The second type of
legislation is those laws that attempt to limit fascism by “proscribing subversive movements
altogether.”113 While this is the most direct way of stopping fascist groups, in particular
specifically outlawing their existence, few legislatures have pursued this route. In general, those
nations which have outlawed extremist groups, do so indiscriminately, and avoid a “[s]pecific
legal definition of what constitutes a subversive party.”114
The third and fourth types of laws are those that restrict private paramilitary groups and
the wearing of military uniform and badges. Such laws have been passed by most democratic
nations, and work to “strike at the roots of the fascist technique of propaganda, namely, self-
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advertisement and intimidation of others.”115 These laws have not proved particularly
controversial, other than in Germany, which repealed a federal ordinance prohibiting private
armies in 1932 after only two months.116 Similar to the third and fourth types, the fifth type of
law is a prohibition of the private manufacture, use and possession of firearms or other weapons.
As part of these prohibitions, according to Loewenstein a “vigilant police force should be in
position to prevent at least any large-scale accumulation of arms in private hands.”117 Although
never stated, Loewenstein clearly believes that the threat implicit in this law is not particularly
potent, considering the poor track record of fascism in overthrowing a democratic government
through outright revolution.
The sixth type of laws are those that “deal with abuse of parliamentary institutions by
political extremism.”118 While not popular, these laws act to deprive a fascist group of its legally
represented spokesperson, thereby taking “the edge... off subversive propaganda.”119 Similar to
the sixth type, although less severe, the seventh type of law is one that aims at “curbing excesses
of political strife.”120 Passed in Canada, the Netherlands and Czechoslovakia, these laws seek to
prevent “political acrimony when it was directed against persons or classes of persons or
institutions usually singled out for attack by fascism” by “forbidding incitement and
agitation.”121
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The eighth type of law seeks to prevent fascists from creating disturbances through
“organized hooliganism,” by curbing their right to assembly.122 These laws, as well the ninth
type and tenth type – laws that limit fascist speech – are examples of laws that curb a
fundamental right. These laws are the embodiment of Loewenstein’s idea of militant democracy,
and the reluctance of democratic nations from adopting them (they are the “thorniest problem of
democratic states”) reveals the difficulty of convincing democratic nations to utilize autocratic
techniques as part of their own defense.123 As Loewenstein warns, “democracies that have gone
fascist have gravely sinned by their leniency [of speech], or by too legalistic concepts of freedom
of public opinion.”124
Part of any war is the maintenance of a standing army, and the eleventh type of law
attempts to “protect [a nation’s] armed forces against infiltration by subversive propaganda.”125
History has proven that “fascism is, on the whole, not unfavorably received by officers of the
armed forces,” and some countries, including Belgium (1934) and Great Britain (1934), have
enacted laws above and beyond existing military regulations that are “designed to curb
incitement to disaffection among the armed forces.”126 Unfortunately, these laws have done little
to target fascism directly, and have been mainly (and misguidedly) aimed at communism,127
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which Loewenstein clearly does not consider a threat to democracies in the way that fascism
is.128 Similar measures have been undertaken to protect civil offices and public officials in the
same way, and these measures constitute the twelfth type of law.129
The thirteenth type of law is perhaps the most controversial and proactive measure a
democratic state can undertake, and involves the creation of a police force devoted solely to the
“discovery, repression, supervision, and control of anti-democratic and anti-constitutional
activities and movements.”130 While Loewenstein believes a force along these lines should be
“established in any democratic state at war against fascism” – therefore all democratic states –
by 1937 only Switzerland and the Scandinavian states have pursued this strategy, and only along
limited lines.131 Loewenstein believes it is imperative for democratic nations to follow “the
example of the dictatorial and authoritarian states,” including “making it an offense [for all
citizens] not to report to the competent authorities information concerning unlawful and
subversive activities.”132
The final type of laws are those that attempt to “parry [the] subversive activities directed
against the state from the outside,” in particular fascist and anti-democratic propaganda.133 While
nothing can be done to prohibit foreign radio broadcasts, Loewenstein believes that democratic
states should work to prohibit “the political activities of foreigners or alien emissaries on national
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territory,” and censor foreign newspapers.134 Just as with the thirteenth law, such laws would in
practice stifle a population’s access to information, again demonstrating the ferocity with which
Loewenstein believes democratic countries must confront fascism. This, in turn, emphasizes the
implied threat of fascism. To him, such extreme measures are the only appropriate response to
the calamity that is laying siege to Europe.
After reviewing the fourteen different types of anti-fascist legislation, Loewenstein
makes a surprisingly optimistic observation, in contrast to his earlier dire predictions. He
believes that “at last, the terrifying spell of fascism’s basilisk gaze has been broken… the fascist
technique has been discerned and is being met by effective counteraction.”135 Despite this
hopeful prediction, Loewenstein cannot help but end the article pessimistically, commenting that
democracy should not be lulled by a false sense of optimism, and that democracy must undergo a
transformation “of obsolete forms and rigid concepts into the new instrumentalities of
“disciplined,” or even – let us not shy away from the word – “authoritarian,” democracy.”136
**
The progression from “Autocracy Versus Democracy,” published in 1935, and “Militant
Democracy I & II,” published in 1937 is clear. In the former articles Loewenstein still attempts
to approach the conflict between fascism and democracy as an objective academic. By 1937 this
attempt at objectivity has been abandoned, and Loewenstein is an obvious supporter of the
democratic system. His solution to the way in which fascism is able to subvert democracy for its
own ends, first hinted at in 1935, is now fully formed, and can be seen as a complete formula for
the defense of democracy. Implicit in this development is Loewenstein’s mounting anxiety about
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the threat posed by fascism to the west, an anxiety that is fundamentally informed by his own
pessimism. While by this point Loewenstein is still confining his message to academic
publications, he is one step closer to the full-blown public campaign for the defense of the
democracy that he would soon lead. In that context, “Militant Democracy I & II” can be seen as
another step forward on his journey from academic to advocate.
**
In 1938 Loewenstein published another pair of articles, “Legislative Control of
Extremism in European Democracies I” and “Legislative Control of Extremism in European
Democracies II,” in the Columbia Law Review. These articles describe, in very detailed and
technical terms, the way in which fascist states operate, how democratic states can use legislative
power to curb fascist threats, and, just as in “Militant Democracy,” what anti-fascist legislation
currently exists.
Loewenstein begins “Legislative Control I” with a lengthy introduction that summarizes
the history of fascism. His writing here is similar in content to his earlier articles, although of
note in this section is his review of the history of “legislative measures designed to protect the
existing form of constitutional governments and to repress activities considered as subversive” in
America.137 Such laws have been passed during the American Revolution and throughout the
nineteenth and twentieth century as part of the campaign to regulate immigration.138 More
recently, when faced with the rise of the Ku Klax Klan in the years following World War I,
several American states utilized legislation “intended to combat criminal syndicalism, anarchism
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and sabotage” to root out Klan members.139 Despite the existence of such laws, which could be
considered as militantly democratic, most legislative efforts have been primarily focused on
stopping leftist and Communists and, “little attention… has been paid until recently to similarly
subversive or destructive tendencies entertained by radical movements by the ‘right’ which are
directed against the existing form of popular government.”140 Anti-fascist laws clearly fall into
this category, and Loewenstein is in essence arguing that Americans have too long been
concerned with threats from the left and not the right, and need to take steps to combat fascist
tendencies.
Further, by mentioning America at all, Loewenstein is demonstrating his growing
preoccupation with the idea of a fascist threat on American soil. While he does point out that “at
present no serious threat exists that “authoritarian”… doctrines will penetrate into public opinion
[in America],” he highlights a 1935 law passed by the State of New Jersey “designed to prevent
the customary propaganda techniques of incipient National Socialist movements,” implying that
similar laws should be adopted by other states.141 Clearly, Loewenstein is fearful of the fascist
threat penetrating even America, the bastion of democracy.
While much of what is contained in “Legislative Control I and II” is simply a restatement
of the content of the survey of anti-fascist legislation found in “Militant Democracy” in more
technical language appropriate for a law journal, and therefore unnecessary to review,
Loewenstein’s description of the conflict between fascism and democracy in Europe is
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significant. Just as in “Militant Democracy,” Loewenstein describes the conflict as a war, and the
“the war of doctrines… between fascism and democracy is in full swing.”142 In Europe,
democracy serve[s] as a battle ground for local fascist or National Socialist movements which
aim at replacing the democratic form of government with an “authoritarian” regime modeled on
the pattern of Italy, Germany, or one of the minor satellites of European fascism.143

These nations are exposed to “relentless propaganda” that is part of “a particular emotional
technique of exploiting the existing democratic institutions rights for the vowed end of
undermining and ultimately destroying democracy.”144 Similar to “Militant Democracy,” he
characterizes the conflict as a war, lending his argument for the adoption of anti-fascist
legislation an urgency that it would otherwise lack. While existing anti-fascist legislation shows
a growing recognition that “the dangerous situation resulting from mere acquiescence or from
the treacherous belief that, in the long run, the inherent superiority of democratic values will
assert itself over fascist ideology,” more must be done.145
Also of note is Loewenstein’s repeated criticism of democracies that fail to enact
proposed anti-fascist legislation out of a reluctance to limit the fundamental rights of their
citizens. During his survey of European legislation, he highlights several failed measures – for
example a proposed 1937 constitutional amendment in the Netherlands that would limit
parliamentary participation of subversive parties – commenting that “thus once more
fundamentalist scruples prevented the enactment of measures which, if applied, would have been
an effective self-defense of parliamentarism against its uncompromising enemies.”146
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Loewenstein’s message here is obvious, and echoes his earlier agitation for the quick passage of
laws limiting the fundamental rights of fascists. For him, it is a waste of time to worry about how
legislation against fascism could conceivably violate democratic principles, as relying solely on
these principles is what has allowed the conflict with fascism to progress to the current
emergency situation.
Loewenstein continues his survey in “Legislative Control of Extremism in European
Democracies, II,” which was published shortly after “Legislative Control I.” Again the content of
this article is similar to that of “Militant Democracy,” and attention will be paid only to
particularly noteworthy passages. In the article, Loewenstein summarizes anti-fascist legislation
that concerns party uniforms, military formation of political parties, legislation against the
carrying of arms, legislation protecting democratic institutions, against political propaganda and
legislation restricting free assembly and speech. Just as in “Militant Democracy,” Loewenstein
recommends that democracies adopt strict legislation regulating free speech, and in particular the
press, and act to limit the ability of fascist parties to use a nation’s press organs for disseminating
anti-democratic propaganda.147 While such laws did exist in Weimar before Hitler’s takeover, the
state was hamstrung by its reluctance to enforce its own legislation, and because of the “legalistic
inhibitions of the courts and hesitant enforcement by the governmental agencies [of the law]”
enabled its own destruction.148 Once again Loewenstein is emphasizing that democratic
principles are insufficient, and that only certain restrictive laws enforced without hesitation can
protect democratic states.
While “Legislative Control of Extremism in European Democracies, I and II” do not
show a marked changed in his idea of militant democracy, his tone throughout, especially in the
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context of a law journal, further demonstrates the anxiety with which he regards the fascist
threat, as well as his growing concern with the threat posed by fascism to America.
Loewenstein published another article on militant democracy in 1938, “The Balance
Between Legislative and Executive Power: A Study in Comparative Constitutional Law” in The
University of Chicago Law Review. While, again, much of the content of this article is identical
to his earlier work (namely an in-depth summary of existing European legislation), significantly
Loewenstein here argues for fundamental changes to the function and organization of legislative
and executive bodies in democracies.
In his eyes, the traditional division between legislative and executive power is unsuited to
the current political climate, and in particular the conflict between democracy and fascism.
Instead, Loewenstein favors a small body other than a large elected parliament in order to
guarantee quick decision-making during a crisis situation as “the classic task of the parliament,
namely, law-making by deliberation and sanction, has been overridden by the need of swift
decision which only a small body of men is suited to perform.”149 Faced with the reality of the
twentieth century, the “tenaciously upheld postulate of a separation of legislative and executive
(or administrative) action is unrealistic, obsolete and may become at times even dangerous.”150
While Loewenstein concedes that as part of this system “a rationalized method has to be
found of how governmental leadership should be made amenable to political control of the
people or their representatives,” he provides no detail about how this level of control should be
accomplished.151 Further, despite this apparent acknowledgement of the importance of a check
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on the power of the executive or legislature, Loewenstein argues that “the technical arguments”
for a division of powers or “attendant checks and balances” are no longer valid.152
Loewenstein’s argument here is significant, and reveals his evolving understanding of
what militant democracy is, constituting a second phase of his theory. What Loewenstein is
describing here is a type of quasi-democracy that bears little resemblance to the traditional
democratic system. Clearly, by believing that the structure of this new system should be defined
through constitutional amendments within democratic states, what Loewenstein envisions is not
a temporary solution to the threat posed by fascism to democracy. Instead, this new democracy,
which strongly resembles autocratic governments, in certain aspects, through its “concentration
of political action,” would be permanent. Thus, by 1938, Loewenstein believes that temporary
antifascist legislation is insufficient to protect democracy alone. Now only a fundamental
transformation of the democratic system in order to create a more powerful executive and a
smaller, more responsive legislature can protect democracy from the threat it is faced with.
Loewenstein’s mounting anxiety about fascism is implicit in this evolution. Faced with
success of Nazi Germany, the threat posed by fascism demands more than temporary legislation.
In line with this new understanding, Loewenstein began to argue for the adoption of militant
democracy in techniques in America outside of academic publications, beginning a campaign of
public advocacy that would last for almost a decade.
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Chapter Two
The Advocate: Karl Loewenstein and the
Public Campaign for Militant Democracy

“This is the greatest national emergency in which this
young and great nation finds itself after a
hundred years of comparative peace and prosperity.”153

On September 1, 1939, Nazi Germany invaded Poland, beginning a global conflict that
would span six years and claim tens of millions of lives. For Karl Loewenstein and other
defenders of democracy, the quick capitulation of Poland, and Germany’s dramatic victory over
France less than a year later, only reinforced their fear of an inevitably, creeping fascist tide
overtaking the west. Faced with this new reality, Loewenstein began to engage in a public
campaign for the adoption of militant democratic techniques within America, arguing that such
legislation was necessary to prevent the United States from being defeated by a Fifth Column of
fascist loyalists.
Loewenstein waged this war on several fronts. Beginning with two book reviews
published in The Nation that hinted at his theory of militant democracy, by 1940 and the fall of
France Loewenstein undertook his campaign with a new urgency, speaking publicly in favor of
antifascist legislation at Amherst College and during a lecture to the American Bar Association,
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where he argued for the quick passage of a Federal Order Act limiting the activities of fascist
sympathizers. In these reviews and speeches, Loewenstein’s pessimism about the future of
democracy, as well as anxiety about an impending fascist takeover of the United States are clear,
and these sentiments appear in his public correspondence even after the American entrance into
World War II and the defeat of Nazi Germany in early 1945. In 1944, with American victory in
Europe imminent, The Nation published an editorial in which Loewenstein argued that in postwar Germany, fascism, if not properly contained, would continue to pose a threat to America
interests and democracy.
Even after the end of the fighting, and during his tenure working with the occupying
American forces as part of the American Military Government (OMGUS), Loewenstein still
could not escape his anxiety about fascism. In a series of letters to the editor published in The
New York Times in response to an article about the progress and effectiveness of denazification,
he argued that denazification had failed, and Germany was rife with fascists and Nazis. The tone
in these letters is remarkably similar to his writings during the peak of Hitler’s success in
Europe, and only further demonstrates his furor as an antifascist.
Throughout his writings and lectures, Loewenstein implicitly and explicitly refers back to
his academic work on militant democracy, advocating at every turn for the adoption of strict
antifascist legislation that would curb the ability of American fascists to take advantage of the
democratic system in order to accomplish the destruction of the United States. To him, America
was populated by a secret, undiscovered force of fascist loyalists who were prepared to act
against the interests of the American people, and, if open warfare broke out, would aid the
Germans in conquering America. The academic objectivity present in his early publications on
militant democracy is absent. By 1940 and the collapse of France, Loewenstein was a fullfledged soldier for democracy, doing whatever he could to protect democracy and his adopted
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homeland, even presenting himself as a defender of traditional Anglo-Saxon Christian values.
Beyond the significance of an academic going so far as to give public speeches urging the
acceptance of his political theories, this body of correspondence shows the maturation in
Loewenstein of the new worldview outlined earlier.
Nevertheless, this new worldview, and the documents that show its development, are
absent from the existing Loewenstein historiography. Even Lang’s lengthy Loewenstein
biography glosses over his public advocacy for militant democracy, and the majority of
publications discussed here are missing from his extensive Loewenstein bibliography. This
historiographical deficiency is further evidence of the way in which scholars generally have,
until this point, used Loewenstein, and that simply including him in a footnote as a way to
introduce the idea of militant democracy misses a crucial element of both his theory, and the way
in which émigré intellectuals confronted the political and military success of Nazi Germany.
**
Loewenstein first alludes to militant democracy in non-academic publications in his The
Nation154 book reviews of 1938 and 1939.155 In the first review, “Liberalism Restated,”
published on July 16, 1938, Loewenstein reviews Communism, Fascism, or Democracy?, by
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Eduard Heimann.156 According to Loewenstein, Heimann, a “well-known German scholar now
in this country,” is attempting to conceive of “democracy in its “original” compass as historically
though not logically interrelated with capitalism, and traces in a masterly fashion the
development of both fundamental concepts.”157 While much of the review focuses on
summarizing Heimann’s work – which Loewenstein views favorably – in his critique of several
of Heimann’s political predictions Loewenstein reveals his anxiety about fascism and lays the
groundwork for his later, and much more urgent, advocacy for the passage of antifascist
legislation.
In particular, Loewenstein finds fault with Heimann’s prediction for the future success of
democracy based on the value of humanism, an argument that he characterizes as an “incurable
idealism, perhaps the heritage of [Heimann’s] German education which belies his Marxist
propensities.”158 Instead, to Loewenstein
[t]hings have gone too far in these hectic years since the war; the masses have become too
awakened, the bourgeois too frightened and too stubborn, the farmers too restless under the threat
of mechanization, and, above all, the militaristic spirit has penetrated too deeply into our
subconscious mind, to allow any idyllic solution which bases its arguments on the goodness or
the reasonable of human nature.159

Sadly, this idyllic solution is incompatible with the realities of 1938, and “the impending
catastrophe will pay little heed to utopian dreams or wishful thinking,” as “the terrified world
already hears the hoofs of the apocalyptic horse clanging over the devastated fields of
civilizations.”160
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While Loewenstein never explicitly states what this impending catastrophe is, his
language here is remarkably similar to the language used earlier in “Militant Democracy I and
II” to describe the conflict between democracy and fascism. Clearly, he believes that Heimann’s
book, for all its virtues, fails to account for the threat posed by fascism to the democratic spirit,
and that no logical or reasonable person could look on the coming years with optimism for the
continued existence and prosperity for the institutions of democracy.161
This argument is important for several reasons. First, although Loewenstein’s comments
contain no direct reference to militant democracy, or any hint at a possible solution for the
impending apocalypse facing civilization, this review can be seen as the first step in a public
campaign advocating the adoption of antifascist techniques. When read in the context of his
earlier academic work, Loewenstein’s references to realism speak to the common belief among
defenders of democracy that democratic principles alone are sufficient to protect a democratic
state from fascism. This belief – an idyllic solution – is inadequate when confronted by the
reality of fascist techniques, and idealism is meaningless when measured against the science of
161
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fascist infiltration. Such writing is clear evidence of Loewenstein’s pessimistic worldview. He
directly dismisses any idealistic vision of a future defined by democracy’s success. Instead – and
clearly as a result of his own experience with fascism, as well as the forward march of Hitler and
fascism across Europe throughout the 1930s – reality has shown that only by facing fascism
head-on can democracy succeed in defeating the challenge it faces.
Second, Loewenstein’s description of the growth of a militaristic spirit that has
penetrated into the subconscious mind provides an interesting insight into Loewenstein’s own
thinking. Clearly, his belief in a reformed democracy that militantly and legislatively responds to
threats is a product of his own belief in the militarization of the modern day mind. When viewed
in this way, militant democracy can be seen as a solution uniquely suited to the world in which it
was conceived.
Finally, simply through the act of using a book review as a medium to warn the public of
the impending crisis, Loewenstein is revealing the urgency with which he has undertaken the
defense of democracy. “Liberalism Restated” is a model for Loewenstein’s subsequent
publications in The Nation. When given the opportunity, regardless of the circumstances, he
attempts to warn the public of the threat posed by fascism, and by doing so, implicitly advocates
for his unique solution to the crisis facing democracy.
This model is apparent in the second relevant book review of June 17, 1939. In “Collapse
of the Weimar Republic,” he reviews Inside Germany, an account of the fall of the republic and
the rise of the Nazi regime, written by Albert C. Grzesinski,162 a former Weimar government
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policies. He served as Prussian Minister of the Interior from October 6, 1926 until February 28, 1930, when
revelations of an affair between Grzesinski and an American actress forced him to resign on February 28, 1930. He
rejoined the government on November 6, 1930 as police president of Berlin, a post he had held earlier in his career.
He was dismissed from this position as part of Franz von Papen’s coup in Prussia on July 20, 1932. He stayed out of
politics for the remainder of his time in Germany, and fled Germany in 1933 after Hitler came to power. See

56

official.163 To Loewenstein, while Grzesinski’s account, to its credit, describes Weimar “without
affectation or pretentious humility,” there is “surprisingly little in [his book] that is actually
new.”164 Inside Germany fails to answer important questions about Weimar, especially about the
conflict between Stresemann and German industry, which Grzesinski, because of his position in
the government, could have provided particular insight into.
After identifying the deficiencies in Grzesinski’s work, Loewenstein presents his own
explanation for Weimar’s collapse, referencing his earlier work on militant democracy.
Loewenstein again advocates for antifascist legislation and a rigorous defense of democracy.
According to him, Weimar did not collapse as the result of a poorly written constitution. Rather,
it failed through the peculiar misfortune of the Germans: that a good constitution was bungled by
incompetent or disloyal men. Few had the insight, and of these few none had the courage and the
power to reform and if necessary to wreck the overtowering machinery of the army, the
bureaucracy, and the courts which the republic had inherited from the imperial regime and which
were kept inviolate before deluded public opinion. The democrats… had not the courage of their
convictions.165

America and the other democracies “commit the same sins of omission,” and “in discovering…
the communistic mote in their neighbor’s eye [ignore] the fascist in their own.”166 The fall of
Weimar was not unavoidable, and came about because “there was too much of civil rights in
republican Germany, but for the wrong people, and too much militancy, but again by the wrong
people.”167
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When compared to his academic publications, it is obvious to what Loewenstein is
alluding. In Weimar, democrats, possessed of a belief in the infallibility of their democratic
principles, granted access to their fundamental rights. The fascists, in turn, used these rights to
destroy the democratic institutions, and implement their own system. In this failure Loewenstein
sees a powerful warning that the remaining democracies must heed. As he first explained in
1935, fascism defeats democracy through the false belief of democrats in the infallibility of their
institutions, leading them to avoid taking necessary proactive defensive steps.
Just as in “Liberalism Restated,” Loewenstein again is using a book review as a platform
to warn the public about the consequences of a complacent democracy, although, unlike in 1938,
he hints at a solution. Implicit in his description of the failures of Weimar, although never clearly
stated, is the argument for the limitations of the civil rights for the wrong sort (fascists), the same
argument at the core of Loewenstein’s theory of militant democracy. Significantly, this
implication can be seen as his first public description of the techniques of militant democracy,
and an important development within his advocacy. Now Loewenstein is presenting the readers
of The Nation with a description of the dilemma facing America, and hinting at a scheme by
which democracy can be protected.
**
Loewenstein first reveals this scheme in a speech given to members of the American Bar
Association on September 11, 1940, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and here, for the first time,
lays out a thorough plan for the prevention of fascist infiltration in America. The images and
themes he stresses – in particular the idea of democracy acting as a Trojan Horse for fascism, and
the threat to America posed by Fifth Column of hidden fascist sympathizers – appear in his
public statements and writings throughout World War II and during the post-war period. As with
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the The Nation reviews, no mention of this speech, or its subsequent coverage in The New York
Times,168 appears in any of the secondary literature on Loewenstein.169
Like his earlier academic writing, Loewenstein’s speech must be examined within the
historical context that it was given. Between the publication of “Collapse of the Weimar
Republic,” and the Bar Association speech, World War II had begun and the position of
democracy in Europe had considerably worsened. Germany’s conquest of Poland in 1939 had led
to a tense standoff between German and Allied forces in the west. This pause in hostilities ended
on May 10, 1940, when Germany launched Fall Gelb (Case Yellow), the planned invasion of
France, Luxembourg and Belgium. Within a month-and-a-half the French forces had been
routed, and on June 25 the French and Germans concluded an armistice, after which France was
divided into a large German occupied territory and a smaller German client state, Vichy. Many
observers believed that the key to Germany’s rapid victory was the infiltration of fascist
sympathizers and saboteurs into France prior to the invasion, viewing this “Fifth Column” as an
essential part of the Nazi strategy.170
While the British Expeditionary Force was able to successfully evacuate back to England,
thereby saving a remnant of the Allies’ land forces and the prospect of continued resistance, the
quick collapse of France was an unmitigated disaster. As Loewenstein emphasized in “Autocracy
vs Democracy” in 1935, France was the key to a continued democratic presence on the European
168
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continent, and the destruction of one of the leading opponents of fascism represented a
cataclysmic development in the war between the two ideologies. Faced with this development
(and the apparent triumph of fascism it symbolized), Loewenstein redoubled his efforts to
advocate for militant democracy, becoming even more anxious about fascism in the United
States.
This anxiety is apparent in his next speech, titled “A Federal Order Act Against
Subversive Political Activities.” Here Loewenstein warns his audience of the existence, in an
obvious reference to the fate of France, of a Fifth Column of fascist loyalists living within
America and waiting to support Hitler in an attack on the United States.171 While there have
always been native groups opposed to the national interest of the United States during any
conflict throughout its history, the fascist Fifth Column is unique, as it can be supported by
fascist governments abroad, without these governments “committing themselves directly” or
publicly to this support, and is thus particularly dangerous to democracy.172
Similar groups existed across Europe during the 1930s, and only after the outbreak of
World War II were these groups, composed of “German nationals173 as well as by citizens…
[are] converted into Trojan horses who actively collaborated with the invaders in disintegrating
171
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national unity and aiding military occupation.”174 The United States must learn from the example
of these European nations, and should pass “appropriate legislative measures” intended to keep
“subversive activities under control.”175 According to Loewenstein, while the Bill of Rights and
democratic principles would seem to argue against these legislative measures,
it should be remembered, however, that during emergency situations in the past - and at the
present our national institutions are more at stake than at any time since the foundation of our
national Republic, - legislative limitations of fundamental rights were sustained by the Supreme
Court.176

This legislation should act to “curb all political activities of aliens which are harmful to national
interests,” and, more importantly, monitor the activities of “American citizens whether native or
naturalized,” as “large sections of German-Americans and Italian-Americans are in active
sympathy with the governments and policies of their homeland.”177
To accomplish these goals, Loewenstein proposes the speedy adoption of a Federal
Public Order Act, with provisions that would include increasing the penalty for sedition,
dissolving anti-democratic organizations, prohibiting the militarization of political groups,
limiting speech intended to support fascism, and the close supervision of press organs that
express sympathy with fascist ideology.178 If such a law is not quickly implemented, the ability
of the United States to defend itself will be impacted, and fascists and fascist sympathizers will
have free reign to disrupt public opinion.179
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“A Federal Order” is an important speech, and is, up to this point, the clearest public
reference to his academic works, as the Federal Order he proposes is virtually identical to the
different types of laws he identified in “Military Democracy I and II” and “Legislative Control I
and II.” There is something especially fascinating about Loewenstein, a German Jewish émigré
himself, warning his audience about the threat posed by other German immigrants. By this point
he clearly sees himself as distinct from his fellow émigrés. He shares in the America democratic
tradition – “our national institution” – and, through advocating for militant democracy, is part of
a group protecting American interests from national and international threats. This
exceptionalism will appear again in later public statements.
Significantly, Loewenstein’s proposals here fall into only the first category of militant
democracy. In his proposed law there is no mention of a permanent reorganization of the United
States’ legislative body, or any alteration of the role or powers of the President. Clearly,
Loewenstein is only proposing the portions of his theory that could conceivably find the widest
acceptance – it is difficult to imagine an audience of lawyers applauding a proposed fundamental
change to the structure of democracy and power in the United States. The fact that Loewenstein
chose not to include the most radical part of his theory, despite his clear belief in its necessity
and effectiveness, shows the urgency with which he believes the fascist threat must be contained.
At this point, whatever legislation can be passed, regardless of how effective it might be in the
long-term, is necessary.
Further, throughout the speech Loewenstein’s anxiety is clear. He states, in no uncertain
terms, and without providing any evidence, that there exists a large army of fascist sympathizers
waiting in the wings to attack America. Composed of more than aliens, this army contains
naturalized and even native-born citizens, and, if not immediately contained, will infiltrate and
destabilize the nation. Loewenstein sees his Federal Order Act not as simply another important
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legislation, but rather as essential, and inextricably tied to national defense. While by 1940
Loewenstein was not alone in his fear of a fascist presence in America, or even in the belief that
this presence extended to naturalized American citizens, the fervency with which he advocated
for antifascist legislation is significant.180
“A Federal Order” marks a clear transition point for Loewenstein, and in this speech his
advocacy reaches its zenith. Here, in contrast to his earlier statements, he explains both the threat
posed to the United States, and how, through militant democracy, this threat can be contained.
To Lowenstein, such laws are vital to American interests, and are absolutely necessary to defend
the United States from fascist infiltration.
**
Loewenstein followed up on his words to the Bar Association with another speech,
delivered on October 8, 1940 at Amherst College in Massachusetts. Loewenstein, along with
Lawrence B. Packard,181 a Professor of History at Amherst, spoke to a gathering of students and
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fellow academics. The content of this speech was later published in a pamphlet titled “America’s
Eleventh Hour.”182 This speech is another clear example of Loewenstein’s public advocacy.
Similar to the Bar Association presentation a month earlier, he argues in favor of restrictive,
antidemocratic legislation, for vigilance against the Fifth Column, and, for the first time, for
direct military intervention in Europe to aid Britain in resisting Hitler’s onslaught. In terms of his
advocacy, this speech is the fullest expression of both his theory of militant democracy, as well
as the various means he employs in hopes of convincing the public of the importance and
necessity of the application of such techniques in America.
Packard and Loewenstein begin by stating in “unequivocal language” the necessity of
America intervening militarily to aid Britain.183 America must, while there is still an opportunity,
“give to Britain, the last democracy in Europe and our next-of-kin among nations, all the aid
which we are able to render, without hesitation, restrictions, or limitations.”184 By 1940, events
have progressed too far for America to stay out of the war, and if America wants to head off Nazi
incursions into South America or the inevitable attack against the United States, Americans
“must throw the full weight of our moral and material support behind Britain and the British
Empire while there is yet a toe-hold in Britain from which to fight and hold off Nazi
Germany.”185According to Packard and Loewenstein, this argument is not “war mongering,
nor… hysteria. It is simply common sense. It is the belief that an ounce of prevention is worth a
explains the relationship between the two scholars, bearing these facts in mind it is reasonable to assume that
Loewenstein was the driving force behind the speech, and its content can attributed to his evolving worldview.
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pound of cure.”186 America “must defend America in Britain.187 Let us learn from the experience
of Britain and France.”188
Loewenstein’s argument and thought process here recalls his earlier explanation of the
necessity for militant democracy. Throughout his academic publications, he presents militant
democracy as a proactive solution to a problem that can be observed through close examination
of the failures of the European democracies. Now, America, based on similar observations, must
recognize the need to provide aid to Britain in order to head off a Nazi threat. If America fails to
heed the warning provided by history, and allows Nazi Germany to defeat Britain, Hitler will
assuredly turn next to South and North America, and the battle against fascism will have to be
waged on American soil.
In arguing such, Loewenstein is adding a new dimension to his theory of militant
democracy. Implicit in his advocacy for direct military and material intervention on the part of
Britain is the understanding that preventive antifascist legislation can only go so far. Fascism has
reached a point where force of arms is required to defeat it, and simply hoping – as
Czechoslovakia and other European nations had earlier – that democratic ideals or even militant
democracy will suffice to guarantee the future of democracy is foolish. This argument, in turn,
further demonstrates the alarm with which Loewenstein views the spread of fascism. To him, and
as he states throughout this speech, the stakes for America have never been higher. America is on
the brink.
After arguing for the necessity for military intervention in Europe, Loewenstein and
Packard describe the threat facing America. The United States is part of “a deadly struggle
186
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between two opposite ways of life, between two political principles which – as experience has
taught us – cannot live peaceably side by side in this world.”189 This struggle is “a war of the
Will to Power against our faith and religion, against tolerance and humanitarian values, against
our national traditions and cherished ways of life.”190 Reference to Nietzsche notwithstanding,
this description is particularly important, and shows Loewenstein’s continuing attempt to use any
effective argument, regardless of its accuracy, in order to convince the public of the importance
of his statements. Before this speech, Loewenstein has, at every opportunity, argued against an
idealistic view of democracy, believing that, when confronted by the new reality of political life
in the 1930s and 1940s, cherished ways of life and national traditions are irrelevant, and only the
reality of the political scene matters. Yet, here, Loewenstein is using these very same arguments
to convince his audience of the severity of the threat facing America. The same beliefs that he
labored to discredit are now shown as the qualities that will be threatened by fascism.
This threat will appear on several fronts. Germany, after defeating England, “will be
ready instantly for the attack on the United States.”191 Hitler’s assault will either take the form of
an economic attack, by working to isolate the United States and deprive the nation of resources,
or through a direct military attack. Loewenstein believes that Hitler hopes to destabilize America
to the point where the despairing citizenry will embrace fascism, and flock to a growing
American fascist movement. If this movement comes into existence, it would mean that
the under-privileged, those whom we call the dregs of society, the unsuccessful, the frustrated, the
lunatic fringe, will eagerly seize the opportunity of gaining ascendancy. It will mean that the
foreign nationalities in this country, the Germans, Italians, and other races, stimulated from their
homelands under the Nazi whip, will try to oust their traditional control of the Anglo-Saxons. It
means that the freaks and the ranks, the white trash, will rule your town council, your state
government, and control the Federal authorities. We are headed for a civil war much more
189
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devastating than the War Between the States unless we do our part in stemming the totalitarian
tide now.192

This passage, again, shows Loewenstein’s newfound adaptability. He is presenting the conflict
between fascism and democracy as not simply a war between nations, but as a clash between the
traditional American way of life and a destabilizing force that seeks to destroy all of the
institutions of the United States. Fascism is the ideology of the white trash, of the lower classes,
and if Hitler is not defeated in Europe, and America does not intervene on the part of England,
than the United States is headed for a civil war.
Further, there is something especially ironic about a Jewish German émigré speaking
about Anglo-Saxon tradition. Just as in “A Federal Order Act,” Loewenstein, despite his
heritage, is including himself as part of the ruling Anglo-Saxon class structure. While this
inclusion may be partly explained by his affinity for England, as seen in his biography, it is more
than likely simply another example of his willingness to use any argument possible to convince
the public of the necessity of adopting militant democracy to fight off fascism. By late 1940,
Loewenstein’s advocacy has progressed to the point where he is willing to do anything to further
his cause. He has become a true soldier for democracy, fighting with the fervency of a zealot to
protect the system he holds in such high regard. This sentiment stands in stark contrast to his
earlier academic writings, especially “Autocracy vs Democracy,” where he takes considerable
time to explain that the conflict between fascism and democracy may simply be part of the
forward progress of changing political ideas, with democracy joining the ranks of other
discredited belief systems.
Key to the fascist threat facing America is the existence of a large Fifth Column, hidden
among the public. Today “the enemy is in our midst,” as “there are allies of the enemy in this
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country, organized, ready to organize, and as yet unorganized. We call them the Fifth Column,
but we do not take them seriously enough.”193 This group is “[f]ound among our fellow
citizens… there are countless spies in this country, in our tool and armament factories, in our
airplane plants; they may even be in our National Guard.”194 Just as dangerous as the outright
collaborators are those who are unwittingly part of the Fifth Column, the “isolationists, the antiBritish, the socialists dreaming of the socialist millennium, the compromisers, the appeasers, the
ostriches.”195
According to Loewenstein, the crux of the problem is not in identifying disloyal and
dangerous citizens, but rather that there are “no laws to deal with them; they are free to speak
and to act under our democratic tenets.”196 This argument is the core of militant democracy, and
is one of the clearest, and most articulate examples, of its expression. Here is the heart of his
advocacy: America is rife with traitors, yet we can do nothing to stop them. The solution – the
passage of laws allowing the Fifth Column to eliminated – is obvious.
Unfortunately, despite the apparent obviousness of this need, much of America labors
under what Packard and Loewenstein term “Our Dangerous Illusions,” which prevent the
necessary steps to protect America from being taken.197 While most of the public operate under
the illusion that democracy is the status quo, in reality “democracy is something for the
attainment of preservation of which human beings have to strain every muscle.”198 Up to this
point, America’s democracy has been “gained by force, and it cannot be retained without
193
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continuous vigilance and even, if need to be, without fighting for it.”199 Fascism cannot prosper
without the destruction of “[f]ree and contented peoples living under rulers of their own
choice.”200 As Loewenstein eloquently summarizes,
democracy, therefore, lest it remain a hollow shell, must be something for which we are willing to
fight, and if need be, to die. Democracy is not only rights, as much more so, duties for those who
do more than pay lip-service to an empty slogan.201

Here, again, Loewenstein makes the stakes as clear as possible to his audience. Failing to
actively resist fascism is akin to working towards the destruction of the United States, as
“[whoever] preaches isolation is either blind or one who works, consciously or unconsciously,
for the totalitarian powers.”202
The hysterical bent to his words is obviously apparent. Loewenstein envisions a secret
force of citizens and non-citizens waiting in the wings to organize and aid Hitler in destroying
America. Even those in favor of neutrality can be considered part of this enemy group: to him,
you are either with him, with the Anglo-Saxon system, or a fascist sympathizer. There is no
middle ground. Even Loewenstein’s description of Nazis, as revolutionary fanatics “of a nation
deliberately stripped of all moral inhibitions and humanitarian impulses” borders on the hysteric,
especially when spoken by a trained academic.203 As he describes them, National Socialists are
akin to dangerous monsters bereft of human emotion, hell-bent on destroying America and
democracy at all costs. To Loewenstein, there are no divisions within Nazi Germany, and the
Germans that have joined the Nazi party have committed themselves to conquest.
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Fortunately, America can profit from the “blindness, weakness, self-deceit, and
complacency” of the defeated European nations.204 American citizens must “learn by the lessons
taught to the world,” namely the consequences of failing earlier to restrain Hitler’s past
aggressions, and defend Britain.205 In fact, America is already part of this defense, as there is no
compromise possible with Hitler, and the United States must prepare itself for the coming war.206
Key to this preparation, and in line with all of Loewenstein’s academic work, is the
implementation of temporary restrictions on the democratic process, as proscribed by militant
democracy. America
must suspend democracy temporarily in order to save it permanently.207 Do not heed the clamor
of our incurable liberals, who bemoan a spot on the wallpaper while the roof over their heads is
aflame. It may well be that the emergency measures we have to take in wartimes – and we are
already living under war conditions – will bring hardships and even injustice to individuals. But
we cannot grant freedom of speech or of political organization to those who use them only for the
ultimate destruction of democracy. Exaggerated liberalism benefits only the Fifth Column.208

While these limitations are in large part identical to those described at the Bar Association
speech, including restrictions on speech, political parties, the monitoring of foreign-born citizens,
suspension of the right to organize, for the first time Loewenstein comments on the electoral
process. To him, the current energy and attention devoted to the upcoming 1940 presidential
election, with Roosevelt preparing to run for a third term, is an unnecessary diversion.
Americans should “remember that petty party politics and the jealousies of party politicians and
eroded France and England.”209 Instead, American citizens should recognize that there is little
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practical difference between Roosevelt and his opponent, and spend their energies preparing for
the impending conflict with Hitler, as whatever changes are implemented by whoever wins the
election will pale in comparison to the destruction Hitler will unleash on the America way of life
if left unchecked.210
This section is the first, and only, comment in any of Loewenstein’s public discourse that
alludes to the permanent aspects of his theory of militant democracy, the proposed reorganization
of the American legislative and executive branches. While Loewenstein is clearly not advocating
for the extensive changes he proposes in “The Balance Between Legislative and Executive
Power,” he is, in the same spirit, criticizing the existing American electoral process. To him,
party conflicts help promote the “internal disunity [that] is the soil on which fascism thrives.”211
While the rest of “America’s Eleventh Hour” is devoted to outlining the aforementioned
types of restrictive antifascist legislation, and is not substantially different from the Bar
Association speech or even Loewenstein’s academic works, Loewenstein’s comments on the role
of youth in America, and his concluding personal appeal to his readers to act as watchdogs for
democracy, are worthy of special attention. To Loewenstein, America has “given too much
weight to the opinions of our young people. Politics is a matter of the adult, the experience, for
the older generation.”212 While the youth are important, they should not be allowed to participate
“in the decision of our national destinies which their blind idealisms seem entitled to demand.”
Here, once again, Loewenstein’s dislike of idealism, his emphasis on realism, and his pessimistic
worldview, shine clear. In his eyes the youth are incapable of appropriately responding to the
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crisis at hand, and must be deprived, just like fascists (although for different reasons), of the
ability to participate in the democratic process.
Also noteworthy is that, for the first time, Loewenstein directly appeals to the public to
participate in the effort to identify the Fifth Column. As part of his concluding comments, he
extolls his listeners to act
if you believe… that you have discovered an activity detrimental to American interests
and national defense, communicate your observations, under your name, to the federal authorities.
Don’t take the law into your own hands, and don’t embitter our social relations by unwarranted
suspicions.213

To Loewenstein, the threat posed by fascism is so severe that all citizens must participate in a
policing process to root out the Fifth Column. This argument is yet another manifestation of
Loewenstein’s anxiety about the fascist threat facing the United States.
“America’s Eleventh Hour” is perhaps the best, and most thoroughly reasoned, example
of Loewenstein’s public advocacy, and shows an academic starkly different from the one
presented in most articles or monographs concerning militant democracy. In virtually every
statement Loewenstein describes the threat facing the United States as dire, and argues that the
only chance America has to resist Hitler is to quickly adopt laws in line with his theory of
militant democracy
**
Loewenstein’s advocacy for militant democracy relented from 1941 until 1944,
especially after America joined the war following the attack on Pearl Harbor. During this period
Loewenstein taught at Amherst and consulted part-time with the State Department on matters
related to South America, another area of academic interest.214 His advocacy would reemerge in
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1944, as the Allies found greater success on the battlefield, and the defeat of Nazi Germany
became more likely.
On August 26, 1944 The Nation published an editorial written by Loewenstein, titled
“The Trojan Horse,” in which he argues for harsh political restrictions on conquered Axis
nations, lest fascism reemerge and continue to menace democracy.215 By late 1944, Allied
victory in Europe was almost assured. America, British and Canadian forces had successfully
landed at Normandy, and were progressively pushing the Wehrmacht back towards Germany’s
borders. A week earlier leading elements of the Allied had entered Paris, and a day before the
article’s publication the Germany garrison occupying the city officially surrendered. By any
standard, the sun had set on Hitler’s ambitions, and, beset by American, British and Canadian
forces in France, and Russian forces on the Eastern Front, the German stranglehold on Europe
had been broken.
Yet, despite these positive developments – Hitler, the architect of Loewenstein’s
immigration to America, and the standard bearer for the political ideology that he worked so hard
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to combat, had failed in his quest to subjugate Europe – Loewenstein remains anxious about
fascism. His editorial discusses the impending political reorganization of a subjugated Germany,
arguing against the concept of political self-determination, or allowing German citizens to
decide, without external input, on the form a new government would take.216 Instead,
Loewenstein believes that
there is no absolute right of internal self-determination, and consequently, that the victorious
states must be prepared to claim, and must be permitted to exercise, the right of intervention in
the internal affairs of any state which “chooses” a “form of government” constituting by its nature
and potential development a threat to their own security and to universal peace.217

Loewenstein recognizes that this argument runs counter to the traditional notions of sovereignty,
as “for more than a century no responsible authority has dared to challenge the equality,
sovereignty, and independence of states as the premises of the law of nations.”218 But, faced with
the possibility of a liberated Germany turning again to a fascist or autocratic government, this
independence cannot be granted.
To Loewenstein, the past decade has shown the folly of such freedom. “Hecatombs of
innocent victims have been sacrificed because the despots were permitted, under protection of
the dogma of internal self-determination, to extinguish the freedom of their own people.”219 To
prevent such a catastrophe from occurring in the future, and to guarantee that no new autocratic
system emerges, as these systems are “diametrically opposed” to democracy, Loewenstein
believes that the defeated Axis nations must be forced to follow a number of rules.220 While
these rules fall short of forcing these nations to adopt a democratic form of government, they act
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to allow democracy “to grow from within by popular acceptance,” thereby accomplishing the
same effect.221
First, after their defeat, each Axis nation should convene a constitutional convention
overseen by the Allies in which a democratic constitution should be drafted and create plans for
future free elections.222 Second, once these elections are convened, they should be
held under the control of the United Nations, or of an international police if by that time it has
been created. Certain categories of discredited people, such as Nazi officials, prominent
sympathizers, notorious turncoats, collaborationists, and so on, are to be excluded from eligibility
by law. Nor are parties with anti-democratic platforms, leaders, or techniques permissible.223

Third, at every step of this process, the Allied governments should have the ability to veto
constitutional provisions that they view as “a danger to the operation of a democratic form of
government” in order to protect their own interests.224 Fourth, the proposed constitutions must
contain an extensive Bill of Rights, with special emphasis on the ability of citizens to freely
participate in government.225 Fifth, and finally, once these steps have been met, and a sitting
government is elected that is clearly pro-democracy, the Allied governments may step back, and
allow the state to enjoy self-determination.226 If these steps are not taken, then America will
again be threatened by an autocratic government risen from the ashes of Nazism. Germany and
the other Axis nations, through their actions and choice of governments, have abrogated their
right to self-determination, and only though an obvious commitment to democracy can this right
be earned back.
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Loewenstein’s words here show the continuing evolution of his understanding of what
militant democracy means. While the steps he proposes Allied nations should force upon the
defeated Axis states are similar in both content and approach to the provisions of militant
democracy as outlined in “Militant Democracy I and II,” the restrictions on the rights of fascists
included here are seemingly permanent, and not temporary in nature. Loewenstein gives no
indication that Nazis or anti-democratic citizens, despite his apparent belief in the importance of
free participation of all citizens in the democratic process, will ever be allowed to vote or hold
office. This distinction shows his evolving theory of militant democracy, as well as the anxiety
with which he regards the soon to be defeated Axis nations. Even though fascism has clearly
failed, and through this failure become discredited, Loewenstein cannot help but envision a new
autocratic system arising and again threatening democracy. While he argues that the Allies
should not implement democracy from above, instead letting it arise organically from within, his
proposal leaves virtually no option for the defeated nations to pursue an alternative form of
government. Clearly by this point he believes that democracy is the only acceptable form of
government, and for democracy to prosper autocracy must be stamped out. The two competing
ideologies cannot peacefully coexist. This argument stands in stark contrast to his earlier,
academic writings, in particular “Autocracy versus Democracy.”
Once again, this level of nuance is missing from most scholars’ description of militant
democracy. If, for example, militant democracy, as understood in Loewenstein by 1944, was
applied to the War on Terror – a popular topic among scholars referencing his work – it would
seemingly suggest that the United States should destroy all existing autocratic systems, as these
systems, when viewed in the context of Loewenstein’s work, cannot be allowed to coexist with
democracy. The fact this argument has failed to appear in any secondary sources only further
shows the cursory and insufficient way most scholars have used Loewenstein to this point. “The
76

Trojan Horse” again shows the complexity of militant democracy as envisioned by Loewenstein,
his continual public advocacy for the adoption of these techniques, and how this appeal and
theoretical progression are rooted in his ever-present anxiety about fascism.
**
Loewenstein would continue to operate under this anxiety even after the end of World
War II and the final defeat of the Axis. Shortly after the end of the war Loewenstein, while
working with the Legal Division of the United States Office of Military Government for
Germany as part of a team experts brought in to aid in the denazification process, wrote a letter
to the editors of The New York Times, published on June 15, 1945, criticizing the growing
demand to allow fraternization between Allied soldiers and German citizens.
According to Loewenstein, “all reports agree that the Germans are unrepentant, unshaken
and impervious to self-introspection,” and it would be unwise to “expose our GI’s to the as yet
undiluted poison of twelve years of Nazi indoctrination.”227 American soldiers would be
especially susceptible to this indoctrination when coming from “the lips of an attractive female,”
and, despite their best efforts, would be unable to distinguish between good Germans and
Nazis.228 To Loewenstein, the argument against non-fraternization is akin to Hitler’s attack
against the Treaty of Versailles, and it would be folly to “ourselves start [the Nazis] charitably on
the road” towards abrogating their recently signed unconditional surrender.229
Loewenstein’s argument here is clearly tinged with anxiety. He makes no distinction
between members of the Nazi party and the average German citizen, instead presenting Germany
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by and large, with the exception of a few unnamed and undefined good Germans, as a unified
entity populated by rabid, ideological Nazis who are waiting for any opportunity to spread their
vile doctrine to innocent American soldiers. At this point, after the final defeat of Germany,
Loewenstein still cannot escape his fear of the threat posed by fascism. Barely a month after the
utter destruction of the Nazi government and the Wehrmacht, Loewenstein cannot help but
envision another war between fascist Germany and the Western democracies. While in this letter
to the editor Loewenstein never explicitly alludes to his theory of militant democracy or its
techniques, his writing here is the product of that same thought process. The same logic that led
him to earlier argue for the application of strict antifascist legislation, is now leading him to view
every German as a potential Nazi propaganda agent, waiting for their chance to convert an
unsuspecting American soldier. The fact that this thinking is still evident, even after the defeat of
Germany, shows how thoroughly Loewenstein has been consumed by his anxiety, and how
deeply he has become invested in the war against fascism.
This anxiety and suspicion continues to appear in Loewenstein’s writing into 1946. In
another letter to the editors of The New York Times, of December 8, he criticizes the America
denazification process, arguing that it, to this point, had been inadequate, and that Germany was
still rife with Nazis.230 Written shortly after leaving his position with the Legal Division and
returning to Amherst College, Loewenstein begins by explaining the importance of
denazification in the postwar process, as on it, and demilitarization, hinges the entirety of
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German reconstruction.231 Unfortunately, despite the importance of this process, to date the
American Military Government has done an exceptionally poor job rooting out and punishing
Nazis. While the task of discovering Nazis is difficult, especially due to a reluctance by the
military to “oust technically competent men because of party membership,” the entire
denazification process, which relies on small denazification boards to judge and mete out
punishment, is flawed.232 To date, the German people have recognized that these boards are
overtaxed and ill-suited to judging the nuance of Nazi political life, and willingly present
themselves, despite their work for Hitler, as fellow victims of Nazism in order to effectively
escape punishment.233 Unsurprisingly, this strategy, along with an eagerness of American
officials to quickly race through the process, has led to a situation in which “punishments, as a
rule, are light” and hardly any “Nazi gangster [has been tried] on the basis of German common
law.”234
Loewenstein believes the solution to this crisis is to reformat the denazification
procedure. Key to this reformatting is an understanding of the character of the German people,
who are “impervious to moral scruples, if not wholly unregenerate. They realize in the midst of
their misery that they have lost the war. But they do not regret having been Nazis.”235 Bearing
this in mind, instead of attempting to judge every member of the Nazi party, experts should be
brought in to draw a strong line “between [the] small fry and socially prominent and
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professionally important former Nazis.”236 Once identified, these Nazis should be harshly
punished through the German court system and by German common law, and “professions which
are instrumental in the formation of public opinion should be thoroughly and ruthlessly purged
from even nominal Nazis.”237
Again, Loewenstein is presenting the German populace as an amoral entity, although he
is by this point drawing a distinction between the most outrageous of Nazi criminals and the
average party member who joined after Hitler’s rise to power. While Loewenstein never
describes the consequences of failing to implement his proposed new denazification procedures,
when read in the context of his academic writing, and when compared to other examples of his
public writing, it becomes clear that he fears a reemergence of fascist Germany. Similarly, while
he never references militant democracy, his argument for the permanent removal of any Nazis
from positions in which they might have the ability to influence the public reads very similarly to
his argument for the implementation of strict antifascist legislation to deprive fascists of
propaganda tools before the War. Just as in “The Trojan Horse,” here Loewenstein gives no hint
that his proposed restriction on the careers of former Nazis will be temporary. Instead, these
former Nazis will be permanently barred from these professions. Underlying this entire letter is
Loewenstein’s continuing anxiety. Even though over a year has passed since the German
surrender, Loewenstein still fears fascism, and still believes it is his duty to convince the public
of the necessity of a hard anti-fascist stance.
Unlike his earlier letter to The New York Times, Loewenstein’s comments on the
denazification process proved controversial, and solicited a response from Fritz Oppenheimer, a
former Captain with General Dwight D. Eisenhower and later member of the team tasked with
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reorganizing the German judicial system, published on January 12, 1947. Oppenheimer
dismisses Loewenstein’s criticisms as unjustified, calling him a “nihilist,” and derides his
proposed solution as unworkable.238 He argues that the German people are willing to atone for
their crimes, and that “hooligans that have committed specific crimes under the Hitler regime are
being treated as ordinary criminals, in accordance with principles of justice.”239 To date, the
Military Government has investigated over 1,800,000 cases of Nazism, and is implementing a
long range strategy to call all of those over 18 years of age to account for whatever crimes they
have committed under Hitler’s rule.240 While Oppenheimer acknowledges that the task of
denazification is complex and to date has not been completed, he believes that “we are far
advanced on the road towards complete destruction of Nazism.”241
Loewenstein responded to Oppenheimer’s letter on January 16, 1947, and although this
response was not published by The New York Times, it is yet another example of Loewenstein’s
continued pessimism and anxiety. Loewenstein dismisses Oppenheimer’s response, claiming,
“his rejoined seems to fall short of its objective in that it lacks elucidation as to how the
[denazification procedures] stood the test in practice.”242 According to Loewenstein, the Military
Government’s own figures, which show that 92% of cases before the denazification boards
“were declared not chargeable at all,” and recent scandals in the Bavarian government in which
top officials were found to have been prominent Nazis, show the continued failure of the existing
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denazification procedures. Loewenstein also takes issue with the tone of Oppenheimer’s reply,
writing that
it is hardly an edifying experience that a citizen who in a free country brings his anxiety about
what Dr. Oppenheimer rightly calls “the crucial test of Germany”, to the forum of public
discussion, runs the risk of being accused, by a government official, of “nihilism”, a term
obviously denoting disagreement with government policies.”243

This letter is another entry in Loewenstein’s long list of public appeals on the subject of
fighting fascism. Although unpublished, Loewenstein’s tone here, several years after the defeat
of Nazism, is as anxious as in his writing during the height of Hitler’s triumph in Europe. Once
again, Loewenstein’s thinking is driven by his anxiety about fascism, and his belief that the
existence of any fascist government poses a dire threat to the continued prosperity of democracy
and America.
**

Throughout the late 1930s and 1940s Loewenstein engaged in an extensive campaign of
public advocacy for the adoption of militant democracy and antifascist legislation, and, after the
end of the war, continued vigilance towards purging the Nazi threat in order to guarantee that
America would never again face a fascist Germany. During this advocacy, Loewenstein’s theory
of militant democracy continued to evolve, until, by 1944, he was arguing for permanent
measures to deprive fascists from participating in the electoral process, and, by 1946, measures
to prevent fascists from even holding jobs in fields deemed important.
Further, throughout his writing and his public speeches, Loewenstein shows the anxiety
with which he regards the fascist threat. During the war he believed in the existence of an
extensive and unknown Fifth Column of fascist loyalists, composed of America-born citizens,
naturalized citizens and resident aliens, waiting for an opportunity to leap into action and aid
243
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Hitler in destroying America. Even after the war, Loewenstein feared the influence of Nazis on
American soldiers, believing that the German citizens were entirely unrepentant for their crimes,
and, if not properly monitored, would again menace democracy. This anxiety at times caused
Loewenstein to verge on the hysteric, and forced him, when advocating in public, to pursue any
strategy he could to argue in favor for the speedy adoption of his ideas, including, despite his
ethnic heritage and nationality, presenting himself as a defender of the traditional Christian and
Anglo-Saxon American worldview.

83

Chapter Three
Brothers-in-Thought:
John Herz, Karl Lowenstein and the Pessimistic Worldview

“I saw my challenge in enlightening the world
about the true character of Nazism.”244

Karl Loewenstein was by no means the only émigré intellectual struggling to understand
the new political reality of life post-immigration. John Herz’s forced immigration also left him
sharply pessimistic, and his work during the years leading up to World War II and its immediate
aftermath shows a scholar struggling to reconcile the clash between fascism and democracy. He,
too, sought to discover the way in which the surviving democratic systems could successfully
navigate through an increasingly chaotic and troubled world. Unsurprisingly, Herz also worked
with the American government during the war, and, after leaving government service, was
sharply critical of denazification and the actions of the Military Government in postwar
Germany.
Yet, despite their similar biographies and worldview, Herz arrived at a markedly different
solution to the democratic dilemma than Loewenstein, foregoing the idea of militant democracy
in favor of a nuanced outlook predicated on abandoning both idealism and realism for a
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measured and sophisticated combination of both he termed Liberal Realism. Consequently,
Herz’s work, despite its pessimism, lacks much of the sharpness and anxiety so evident in
Loewenstein’s thought, and functions as a counterpoint that demonstrates the uniqueness of
Loewenstein’s theory of militant democracy, as well as an example of the way in which other
émigré thinkers were able to understand the new world in which they found themselves. Where
Loewenstein saw nothing but continual anxiety, Herz saw an escape from pessimism, and was
able to conceive of a world with a functioning, peaceful international system which incorporated
both democracies and non-democratic governments.245
**
Herz, like Loewenstein and hundreds of other intellectuals, was forced to flee Germany
in 1933 after being dismissed from his job as a law clerk because of his Jewish heritage.246 He
left Germany for Geneva, Switzerland, where he resumed his studies at the Geneva Graduate
Institute of International Studies under Hans Kelsen.247 Herz had previously worked with Kelsen
from 1927 to 1931 at the University of Cologne, where he was schooled in Kelsen’s Pure Theory
of Law, which “tried to liberate legal theory from all religious, scientific, ethical, sociological
and political elements.”248 Kelsen argued that “the legislator was not bound by fundamental
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moral values or ethical principles,” and that “every law passed in accordance with set procedures
was binding and needed no further justification,” regardless of its content.249
While in Geneva, Herz, troubled by the spread of fascism across Europe and the failure
of the League of Nations to prevent Italy from invading Ethiopia, began to move away from
Kelsen’s Pure Law,250 eventually coming to believe that analyzing international law in a vacuum
“in the Kelsian sense appeared increasingly absurd.”251 During this period he began to develop
the particular theory combining realism and idealism that would underpin his work for the next
several decades. For him, the question of the modern age was to define the way in which
international relations functioned, and how “international law, apparently a system of practical,
enforceable norms binding upon nation-states, can be conceived as a normative, functioning
system.”252 In Herz’s eyes, Kelsen’s positivistic system failed to account for the fact that
“international relations were essentially still anarchical in nature,” as well as to explain the
reality of how, during this time, the European nations confronted each other.253
For Herz, the experience of being removed from his job due to his ethnic heritage and
being forced to leave Germany was traumatic, and fundamentally altered his worldview,
infecting him with a pessimism that would define much of his later academic output, especially
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during the period surrounding World War II. In his biography, he links the trauma of this
experience to his evolving understanding of international relations (and growing distance from
Kelsen), as well as clearly describes the overwhelming emotional impact of his forced
immigration. For Herz, the flight to Geneva
meant shifting from the area of the normative (law) to that of facts and events, the brutal realm of
politics. And brutal they were. [The Nazis] had destroyed my idea of a planned, orderly life and
career in an ordered, minimally decent, reformable environment. Now the chasms of the 20th
century were revealed: the abyss of racism that was to end in the holocaust; already foreshadowed
in the blood-fillled trenches of World War I; absolutely brutal rulership, as prophesied by Jacob
Burckhardt. All of this destroyed remnants of still existing rationalistic belief in “inevitable
progress.” The world became a theater of the absurd, and I became more and more pessimistic.
Suicide might have been the logical consequence. I weighed the idea from time and time, but
youthful energy prevented me from taking the final step. Shifting my attention to the realm of
world politics, I found that complete resignation was not a propos. If not from within, fascism
might, perhaps, still be destroyed from without. Thus, to my theoretical interests in analyzing
situations there was added a very practical interest in action: What could be done to promote such
an objective?254

Beyond showing the development of Herz’s pessimism – a worldview shared with Loewenstein
– this description also provides insight into Loewenstein’s character. While Loewenstein’s
immigration to the United States was not as fraught with uncertainty as Herz’s, as he was both
older and more easily able to secure a teaching position, the experience of being forced,
overnight, to abandon the country in which he had spent his entire working life was no doubt
horrifying, and had lasting effects on his worldview. Unfortunately, for Herz, despite his
attempts at navigating the new world order he found himself a part of, after five years in
Switzerland “resignation and even pessimism and a feeling of depression [had] set in,” and he
decided to immigrate to the United States.255 To Herz, this journey was perilous, and he believed
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that “the darkness of my fate seemed tied to the dark fate threatening Europe… my going away
appeared to me as a taking leave from a continent doomed to die.”256
After immigrating to the United States in 1938, Herz was accepted into the Institute for
Advanced Study at Princeton University, where he worked from 1939 to 1941 under Edward M.
Earle.257 While there, he was tasked with researching the historical British balance of power
system, and concluded that “utopianism had too often produced peace plans built on the
quicksands of wishful thinking and therefore highly likely to fail.”258 After leaving Princeton,
Herz was hired at Howard University, and, following Pearl Harbor, joined the Office of Strategic
Services (OSS) in hopes of playing a more active role in the fight against Nazism.259 While in the
OSS, he helped plan the reconstruction of defeated Germany, and, like Loewenstein, was
involved with the preparation for the Nuremburg Trials. Following disagreements over
denazification, he left government service in 1948, and resumed teaching at Howard until 1952,
after which he accepted a position at the City College of New York, where he stayed until his
retirement in 1979. Like Loewenstein, during this period Herz publicly criticized denazification.
After leaving government service, and during his second stint teaching at Howard University,
Herz published his best known work, Political Realism and Political Idealism. Therein, Herz
attempts to solve the dilemma facing modern states and conceive of a new, functional
international system. Despite the pessimism clearly evident in Political Realism and Political
Idealism, Herz’s solution is starkly different from militant democracy and contains hope for a
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peaceful future where nations, regardless of political belief, could coexist. This work best
demonstrates the theoretical differences between the two scholars.
**
During this period, Herz first came into contact with Loewenstein. The earliest existing
exchange between the two dates to January 11, 1940, although based on the content of this letter,
it is clear that the two had been in communication earlier. Unfortunately copies of these earlier
letters are not held in the archives of either scholar. Written from Loewenstein to Herz, this first
correspondence is little more than formalities. Herz had originally contacted Loewenstein asking
after a permanent position at Amherst – two years after immigrating he was still at Princeton and
was encountering difficulty in securing a tenured placement – and while Loewenstein
commiserates with Herz’s predicament, he’s unable to offer any help at this time, but will
contact him if he hears of any positions opening.260 Although short, this letter is instructive in the
burgeoning relationship between the two. Loewenstein clearly understands the difficult situation
Herz has found himself in, and his willingness to aid Herz hints at the shared worldview between
the two thinkers. Both have found themselves isolated in America after their forced immigration,
and while Loewenstein has successfully found a placement by this point, both are part of an
exclusive émigré community.
Herz wrote to Loewenstein again on September 26, 1944 along similar lines. At this point
Herz is working with the OSS, on leave from his temporary position at Howard University, and
is still on the lookout for a tenured faculty appointment as he sees the war drawing to a close in
the near future.261 The main purpose behind Herz’s letter, beyond his job search, is to ask after a
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proposed panel on which both he and Loewenstein would have sat.262 Herz feels the resurrection
of this panel – the “Panel on Comparative Government” – would be especially timely, with the
prospect of the reconstruction of “various European governments” and the “impending problems
of post-Nazi German government” in the near future.263 Again, while short, this letter is further
evidence of the growing academic relationship between the two scholars. Conceivably both are
concerned with denazification and political reconstruction (a concern that will manifest in their
academic work), and Herz regards Loewenstein highly enough to ask after a proposed panel.
Loewenstein responded to Herz on December 4, 1944. While he can offer no help in
Herz’s job search, he reassures Herz that he has a “very high opinion of your work and I am very
anxious to see you properly placed.”264 Loewenstein then concludes the letter on a telling,
pessimistic note. While he believes that Herz’s opinion “that the War will be over soon... may be
correct,” he cannot help but think otherwise, as “the Germans do not seem to be close to
unconditional surrender as we might wish.”265 While brief, this comment is the first hint of
Loewenstein’s pessimism within his correspondence with Herz. By mid-December 1944, and
especially after the Battle of the Bulge, the defeat of Nazi Germany was almost entirely assured,
with the recent liberation of France and the impending invasion of German territory by both
Russian and German forces. Still, even faced with overwhelming evidence of the Allies’
progress, Loewenstein cannot help but express pessimism about the prospects of the war ending
soon.
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This pessimism is much more apparent in the next exchange between the two scholars,
which took place in early 1947. Herz had apparently written to Loewenstein to express
agreement with Loewenstein’s letter to the editor critical of denazification published in The New
York Times and to criticize Oppenheimer’s response in support of the existing denazification
policies. Replying to Herz on January 18, 1947, Loewenstein first thanks Herz for his interest,
and comments that, while he disagrees with Oppenheimer’s response, he is “not sure whether
[he] shall answer,”266 as he “hates polemics.”267 Still, despite this hesitation, he is anxious that
“once again we may miss the boat” in stopping fascism, even though he has “no personal ax to
grind” on the topic.268 Loewenstein apparently pressed the same issue while part of the Military
Government, but unsurprisingly found that nothing he said “would dissuade Oppenheimer, or
anybody... of their God-like attitudes.”269 Loewenstein again ends the letter on a pessimistic note,
citing a letter from Germany he received that morning which included the phrase “the crucial
problem is not to denazify Germany, but to prevent M. G. officers from becoming nazified,”
which he feels is a “neat summing up of the situation.”270
Herz replied to Loewenstein on January 26, 1947. Herz feels strongly that “something
must be done to correct the wrong impression made in the public271 mind by such statements as
Mr. Oppenheimer’s.”272 As to the frustration encountered by Loewenstein while he worked at the
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Military Government, Herz, in his position with the State Department stateside, has found that
“collaboration with the operating people has been quite satisfactory,” although it is still
frustrating “to know, or not to know, what eventually happens to one’s suggestions. Final
decisions, on the part of people ‘with the God-like attitudes’ seem often to be made without the
required background knowledge of factual conditions – to put it mildly.”273
This exchange of letters, more so than any earlier dialogue, shows the similarity in
worldview between Herz and Loewenstein, and in particular the pessimism shared among the
scholars. Herz, like Loewenstein, is disgusted with the track denazification is taking, and also
feels the frustration of working within a government body with no real authority. As he bluntly
describes, in his opinion frequently those who make the decisions on important – and clearly
denazification is such an issue, considering the stakes – lack the requisite background knowledge
to make an informed final choice. Loewenstein’s letter is particularly telling, and reveals the
extent to which he was still, by 1947, preoccupied with defeating fascism. Underlying his
critique of the denazification is a persistent fear that, without a more effective and thorough
process, fascism will reemerge in Germany and once again threaten the west. As Loewenstein
points out, in perhaps his most controversial comment to date, his fear by this point is not that
Americans will become overzealous in their prosecution of Nazis; rather, he fears that the
American soldiers will become nazified themselves. While Herz does not specifically express
agreement with this sentiment, it is apparent through the content of his response, as well as his
overall commiserating tone, that he at least in part shares Loewenstein’s concern. By this point,
Herz shares in Loewenstein’s pessimism and anxiety about fascist, and as a result harbors little
hope for an effective denazification process.
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**
Herz elaborated on his critique of denazification in an article published in the December
1948 issue of Political Science Quarterly. In “The Fiasco of Denazification in Germany,” Herz
explains in detail the timeline of denazification, the gradual process by which the American
commitment to denazification has been subverted both purposefully and through laxity, and
argues that, at the time of publication, Germany was still rife with Nazis, and that these Nazis
still occupied prominent political and economic positions. To Herz, it is clear that
“denazification, which began with a bang, has since died with a whimper,” and that the process
has “opened the way toward renewed control of German public, social, economic and cultural
life by forces which only partially and temporarily had been deprived of the influence they
exerted under the Nazi regime.”274
Herz begins by reviewing the six stages of denazification, which lasted from 1945 until
1948, when the programs were shut down. In the first stage, beginning immediately after the
German surrender, denazification was implemented directly by the American Military
Government. Within this stage, particularly dangerous Nazis were arrested and placed in
internment camps, while other categories of Nazis, as well as those Nazis prominent in the
society, were dismissed from their positions.275 While the standards employed by the Military
Government were “over-mechanical,” by and large “the program, on the whole, resulted in a
fairly comprehensive purge of the administration and other fields.”276
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The second stage began in 1946, when the Military Government, facing criticism that
their system was unduly punishing nominal Nazis, transferred the administration of
denazification to German authorities.277 These authorities operated under the Law for Liberation
from National Socialism and Militarism, issued on March 5, 1946, which provided “very flexible
and, on the whole, fair standards and categories.”278 Under this law denazification was
transferred to local boards and appeal tribunals, and, while initially this move was viewed
favorably, as “the proceedings took place in local communities, the hearings and trials were
frequently characterized by intimidation or even terrorism on the part of Nazis and Nazi
sympathizers.”279The effect of this terrorism was that only a small number of those tried by the
boards were classified as Major Offenders or Offenders, with most Nazis instead being classified
as Followers and allowed to return to their positions. In particular, a Military Government review
of the boards at the end of 1946 found that “less than 20 per cent of the persons MG had
previously found “non-employable” as majors Nazis had been placed in categories with
employment prohibitions, while the remainder had been classified as “Followers” or had been
exonerated.”280
The third stage, beginning in August 1946, involved the passage of amnesty laws that
precluded large portions of the German population from being tried by the denazification boards.
While Herz approves of the intent behind these laws – to exempt obvious Followers from a
timely prosecutorial process – “flexible investigation of individual cases” led to “many a
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prominent Nazi” escaping prosecution.281 Despite these issues, the amnesties, by reducing the
caseloads of denazification boards, presented an opportunity for more careful examination of
those suspected Nazis remaining.
Unfortunately, this opportunity was never taken advantage of, as in the fourth stage of
denzaification the Military Government agreed to amend the Liberation Law, allowing a
prosecutor, with consent of the Military Government, to reclassify any Offender as a Follower.282
The effect of this change was to allow “the majority of the remaining ‘hard core’ Nazis” to go
free, and, to Herz, was part of the “ever growing tendency to terminate denazification by
wholesale extenuation.”283
`

This tendency was even more apparent in the fifth stage, where, beginning in January

1948, Military Government approval for relabeling Offenders as Followers was no longer
required. German authorities also introduced an “expediting procedure,” known as B-Verfahren,
which allowed Followers to be processed in a written procedure.284 By April 1948 over 75% of
all cases tried by the denazification boards were completed through this process, and in February
1948 a Military Government directive “provided for the release from internment camps” of large
groups of remaining Major Offenders, allowing those “who expected severe punishment” to go
underground.285
The sixth and final stage of denazification began in the summer of 1948, during which
the denazification program was shut down. Working to fulfill a deadline that “denazification was
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to be concluded by the summer of 1948,” the denazification boards were “instructed to cut down
on the number of regular trials still to be held.”286 The overall result was that, by June 1948,
denazification was “terminated under such conditions that premium was given to the ‘hard core’
of major Nazis who had managed to delay their trials in hope of forthcoming relaxations,” and
“most of them now would get away without penalties.”287 These released Major Offenders were
allowed to rejoin German society, along with tens of thousands of other Nazis, and resume their
positions.
As proof of his argument, Herz provides examples of denazification cases, drawn from
Military Government reports and German newspaper articles, that illustrate the specific ways in
which the denazification process was subverted, corrupted, or was simply applied in a cursory
and insufficient way. While these examples are too numerous and detailed to be reviewed here,
in particular he highlights cases that evidence leniency shown to “former Nazi propagandists and
ideologists,” “members of the Nazi terror machine (Gestapo, special courts, etc.),” and “public
officials and party officials.”288 Herz also reviews the various means by which Nazis were able to
circumvent or corrupt the denazification boards. Numerous Nazis were able to receive additional
leniency through ridiculous and illogical explanations for their conduct, including joining the
Nazi party “not for idealistic but for egoistic reasons,” or acting “not out of conviction but out of
revenge feeling” when the evidence clearly proved otherwise.289 Herz also finds a significant
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number of cases that show a “laxity in procedures and in enforcement,” as well as those
evidencing “pressure, intimidation, and terrorism in denazification procedures.”290
The end result of this thorough and detailed case review is a clear argument for the failure
of denazification. To Herz, denazification “even where handled under comprehensive regulations
and procedures… has been a complete fiasco.”291 In the aftermath of this failure, “German public
life… is in the process of being “renazified,” with the “denazified” former Nazis able and very
willing to enter, or re-enter, public service, economic positions, cultural activities and so on.”292
The consequence of their reentering is that the American policy of democratizing Germany has
“simply delivered the fragile new democracy to the tender mercies of its enemies.”293 Faced with
this development, Herz fears that “Neo-Nazism may yet justify the hope of the dying Nazi
leaders that one day Germany will come out on top after all.”294
Throughout “Fiasco,” Herz’s pessimism and anxiety about fascism is obvious. Like
Loewenstein, by 1949 he feared that, as a consequence of the American failure to denazify
Germany – either out of incompetence or unwillingness – there is a chance that Nazism will
remerge and again threaten the western democracies. This fear further demonstrates the
similarity in worldview between Loewenstein and Herz: both, despite the utter defeat of Hitler
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and the stirrings of a new, democratic Germany (at least in the American, British and French
zones) believe that fascism will again seize control of the German government.295
Herz followed up on “Fiasco” with a short letter to the editors of The New York Times,
published on May 25, 1949, addressing concerns about how effectively German officials were
screened during denazification. Responding to an article written by the Berlin correspondent,
which claimed that no Nazis who are barred from positions based on their classification currently
held public posts, Herz argues that Germans hold a “cynical attitude towards denazification,” and
that, based on his research, classification is a poor indicator of how much participation an
individual had with the Nazi regime.296 After briefly summarizing his conclusions as presented in
“Fiasco” – namely that the German-run denazification boards pursued denazification with an eye
towards doing whatever they could to move past the Nazi era and not punishing those guilty –
Herz concludes with a chilling sentiment.297 In his eyes, “we should not allow ourselves to be
deceived into assuming that denazification has been a success,” as “we would be in for sorry
surprises later.”298
In writing this letter, Herz is showing again that he believes in the importance of
academics addressing the public in hopes of warning them about the reality of post-war Germany
and the failure of denazification. Just like Loewenstein in 1946 and 1947 (and in the same
venue), Herz is doing his part to make the average citizen aware of the threat posed by a
continuity of public officials between Hitler’s Germany and the new, purportedly democratic
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state. While Herz never specifically explains this threat within his letter, when read with
knowledge of his earlier works, it is clear that he is once again speaking of the possibility of a
renewed fascist Germany threatening America.
**
This pessimism can be further seen in Herz’s most well-known work, Political Realism
and Political Idealism, published in 1951, although almost entirely written during his time at
Princeton prior to World War II.299 While Herz scholars have analyzed Political Realism and
Political Idealism at length, as of yet no work within the historiography has examined Herz’s
book in terms of its pessimism, or used it as part of a comparative analyses with another émigré
intellectual in the context of a shared worldview.300 In this work, Herz discusses his
“understanding of the fundamental301… realities of international politics.”302 In this discussion,
Herz presents a starkly different solution to the dilemma of international politics and the battle
between competing political ideologies than Loewenstein, foregoing militant democracy in favor
of a measured international system that combines realism and idealism. This system was
predicated on simultaneously acknowledging the divisive fundamental nature of mankind
(rendered by Herz as the security dilemma) and an idealistic hope that man, armed with this
knowledge, could create a peaceful international system that would obviate this anthropological
299
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truth.303 Herz’s pessimism can be seen both in the content of his analysis, which sees man as an
inherently violent being, as well as the greater context which this analysis is presented. Yet,
despite his pessimism, and despite his experiences with autocracies, in his theory Herz does not
prescribe a particular political system, believing that, varying forms of government, regardless of
their differences or ideologies, can coexist as long as they employ Herz’s combination of realism
and idealism. This in turn demonstrates the uniqueness of militant democracy, and the
radicalness of Loewenstein’s fight against fascism, especially during the end of the 1930s and
World War II.
Herz’s argument is predicated on his understanding of man’s nature, the “sociopolitical
constellation Herz identified as the starting point of all theoretical inquiry.”304 As he explains in
his first chapter – now a “classic in the literature of IR [international relations]” – human beings
are fundamentally concerned with the security dilemma, or the understanding that man is able to
inflict violence and death on one another.305 As Herz describes it,
[it is] decisive for [man’s] social and political attitudes and ideas [that] other human beings are
able to inflict death upon him. The very realization that his own brother may play the role of
Cain makes his fellow men appear to him as potential foes. Realization of this fact by others, in
turn, makes him appear to them as their potential mortal enemy. Thus arises a fundamental
social constellation, a mutual suspicion and a mutual dilemma: the dilemma of “kill or perish.” of
attacking first or running the risk of being destroyed. There is apparently no escape from this
vicious circle. Whether man is “by nature” peaceful and co-operative, or aggressive and
domineering, is not the question. The condition that concerns us here is not an anthropological or
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biological [sic], and makes the “homo homini lupus”306 a primary fact of the social life of
man.”307

Therefore, man, despite his best intentions, must always be suspicious of his neighbor –
cognizant that, at any moment, violence could arise. The security dilemma forces men into a
paradoxical situation. On one hand, “feeling himself exposed to dangers which threaten his very
life, man begins to be concerned about finding some security against this menace.”308 This leads
man to realize that, on the other hand, “even if he wanted to, he cannot destroy all those who
might become a menace to his existence,” and that he depends on other men “in producing and
obtaining the necessities of life.”309 These two realizations create a dilemma in which man must
both rely and be suspicious of his neighbor, resulting in “competition for the means of
security.”310 This competition takes the form of a struggle to acquire power, namely the
accumulation of goods (food, clothing, or weapons) or control over those who produce goods.
In this struggle for power Herz sees the roots of politics, and the competition between
political groups, or “political units.” These units, as well as the manifestation of these units –
states - can be seen as the security dilemma writ large on a national and international stage.311 As
Herz summarizes,
politically active groups and individuals are concerned about their security from being attacked,
subjected, dominated, or annihilated by other groups and individuals. Because they strive to attain
security from such attack, and yet can never feel entirely secure in a world of competing units,
they are driven toward acquiring more and more power for themselves, in order to escape the
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impact of the superior power of others.312

Thus, “to ensure survival, competing political units, whether they like it or not, have to play the
power game.”313 Appealing to a “higher authority for their protection and survival” is useless,
and the only way for a nation to ensure its security is by competing with its neighbors. This, in
turn, ignites a “vicious circle of suspicion and counter-suspicion, power competition, arms races,
and ultimately war.”314
Herz believes that historically man has pursued either realism or idealism in an effort to
obviate this conflict and overcome the truth that “man is born into a world of fundamental
antagonism.”315 No matter how complex or protracted a theory is, through careful examination it
can be reduced to one of these two “ideal types.”316 To Herz, realism “characterizes that type of
thought which in one form or another, sometimes not fully and other times in an exaggerated
manner, recognizes and takes into consideration the implications for political life of those
security and power factors which... are inherent in human society.”317 In contrast, idealism is
“that type of political thinking which in the main does not318 recognize the problems arising from
the security and power dilemma.”319 Unfortunately, neither of these approaches is able to
overcome the security dilemma and break man free of a perpetual cycle of war and conflict.
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Yet, in these failures, Herz sees the key to a peaceful world, believing that by pursuing
Liberal Realism, a combination of both realism and idealism, man can finally overcome the
security dilemma and progress towards a more peaceful world. In the context of nations, Liberal
Realism is “equidistant from hard-core realism and utopian idealism” and involves “seeking
ways of equilibrium in foreign policy without lapsing into utopian thinking.”320 In short, while
man should be aware his confrontational and aggressive nature, he should, armed with this
knowledge, work towards creating a peaceful system in which aggression is unnecessary. Herz’s
thinking here is clearly an attempt to wed the progressive values of traditional liberalism with an
understanding of man’s violent, irrational character – a character that Herz observed first-hand
during his forced immigration from Germany.
Herz recognizes that this proposed solution is unlikely to occur, acknowledging, “in the
present stage of history, major trends seem hostile to such an endeavor, even beyond the more
general realist power factors which have traditionally hampered the liberal ideal.”321 Still, despite
the unlikelihood of this envisioned future coming to pass, Herz’s system still contains the
possibility of a peaceful world order.322 Importantly, in describing this peaceful world, Herz
never argues in favor of a particular political ideology or form of government. For him, unlike
Loewenstein, the makeup of a government is apparently irrelevant.323 All that is necessary to
achieve peace is the choice by all nations within this system to pursue Liberal Realism,
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regardless of their political organization. Thus, within Herz’s system, democracies and
autocracies could conceivably coexist.
This understanding is clearly a consequence of the particular context in which Political
Idealism and Realism was written and published. While much of the work was written during
Herz’s time at Princeton, before World War II, the concluding chapter and the introduction were
added during the opening years of the Cold War, amid the growing realization the world had
been dived into “basically only two power groups,” democracy and communism.324 To Herz, this
process, as well as the development of atomic energy and the threat posed by the atomic bomb,
makes the pursuit of Liberal Realism essential for the continuation of mankind. If man destroys
himself, “the atomic bomb... will then have made history the story of a race which could not
solve its basic problem of power and security; the sad yet moving saga of hope and failure.”325
At first glance, Political Realism and Political Idealism, and in particular Herz’s views
on the nature of man are thoroughly pessimistic. Further, beyond the specific content of this
theory, the way in which he introduces the work is instructive of his continuing pessimism. In the
introduction to Political Realism and Political Idealism Herz describes the world order as “less
harmonious” than in most of human history.326 Unable to accept eventual, impending doom, to
man not “even the harmony of a pessimistic world-outlook seems to be granted.”327 Instead,
we are simply confused in our views as to what has been, is, and will or should be. A general
malaise is becoming increasingly evident, more so perhaps in the unformulated and unspoken
sentiments and reactions of the multitude than in the statements and the treatises of the
erudite.328
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Herz even goes so far as to directly acknowledge his pessimism, writing, as part of an analysis of
the way in which Realist Liberalism could be incorporated into the existing world order, “there is
real cause for pessimism. We do not belong to those who feel duty-bound to end ‘on a hopeful
note.’”329
Yet, despite this apparent and deep held pessimism, and promise to avoid unnecessary
positivity notwithstanding, Herz’s theory ends with a vision of a future, that, while not utopian,
is free of violence and war, hinging on the fundamental understanding that “man can act,” and,
by doing so, better his state of affairs.330 With this understanding, Political Realism and Political
Idealism and Realist Liberalism can be seen as an academic working out of Herz’s pessimism.
By the end, Herz has moved past his fundamentally pessimistic anthropology, arguing that man,
and therefore nations, can overcome the security dilemma.
**
Comparatively, Loewenstein’s understanding of human nature, as conceived through
militant democracy, is in line with Herz’s description of the security dilemma. Within Herz’s
model, the idea that democracies must take steps to temporarily deprive fascists of fundamental
rights in an effort to protect democratic institutions can be seen as an act by a political unit
attempting to deprive a potentially hostile opponent of power, as part of an effort to feel more
secure. However, beyond this initial understanding, the two theories diverge. While
Loewenstein’s pessimism led him by 1944 and in the aftermath of the war to conceive of militant
democracy as a permanent solution, even going so far as to argue that fascist states and
democratic states could not coexist, thereby advocating for the proactive destruction of fascism
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by democracies, Herz believes that through the creation of an international system peace could
be achieved. If nations, irrespective of their political ideologies, are willing to follow the path of
Liberal Realism, then a peaceful world order can be created and maintained. While Herz
acknowledges that this theorized future is unlikely to come to pass, and is at least in part wildly
idealistic, at least in his understanding of international relations and politics there exists a
possibility for a future free of violence in which man has escaped the constraints of this
anthropology. Contrastingly, in Loewenstein’s militant democracy, there is not.
In the end, Herz was able to overcome his pessimism, while Loewenstein was never able
to escape his anxiety about fascism. This difference underscores the unique quality of
Loewenstein’s militant democracy, as well as its theoretical and practical complexity, features
lacking from the descriptions of militant democracy presented by scholars referencing
Loewenstein’s theory. Despite their shared biographies and similar worldviews, Loewenstein and
Herz arrived at dramatically different solutions for the dilemmas facing modern democracies.
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Conclusion:
The Lasting Influence of Militant Democracy

On May 8, 1949 the new German constitution, the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of
Germany, was approved, and, following review by the Allied Military government (which at that
time still occupied Germany), came into effect on May 23, 1949.331 Included in this new
constitution, with an eye the failures of Weimar and the emergence of the Nazi Party, Germany’s
constitutional court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, has the ability to label political parties as
unconstitutional.332 Detailed in Article 21, section 2,
parties that, by reason of their aims or the behavior of their adherents, seek to undermine or
abolish the free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of
Germany shall be unconstitutional. The Federal Constitutional Court shall rule on the question of
unconstitutionality.333

The Federal Constitutional Court also has the ability restrict the fundamental rights of citizens if
those citizens abuse these rights as part of an effort to undermine democracy, as outlined in
Article 18, which states that
whoever abuses the freedom of expression, in particular the freedom of the press (paragraph (1)
of Article 5), the freedom of teaching (paragraph (3) of Article 5), the freedom of assembly
(Article 8), the freedom of association (Article 9), the privacy of correspondence, posts and
telecommunications (Article 10), the rights of property (Article 14), or the right of asylum
(Article 16a) in order to combat the free democratic basic order shall forfeit these rights. This
forfeiture and its extent shall be declared by the Federal Constitutional Court.334
331
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These two provisions, which act to limit the ability of fascists, communists, or other extremists to
abuse democratic rights in order to destroy the democratic system, are clearly examples of
militant democracy in action, and represent the first time such provisions have been included in
the constitution of a modern state.
Today, following the example of Germany in the Basic Law, numerous countries have
either amended their constitutions to include provisions which can be characterized as militant
democracy, or have passed legislation which seeks to temporarily deprive the fundamental rights
of those that are attempting to overthrow the democratic order.335 Among others, these countries
include Australia, Russia, Turkey and Spain, and today, amid new concerns about domestic
terrorism activity, and in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks on the United States, even
more nations are looking towards militant democracy as a possible solution for Muslim
extremism as part of the War on Terror.336 While this global legislative and constitutional
movement cannot be attributed solely to Loewenstein (similar legislation existed before he ever
wrote on the subject), such laws can be seen as examples of the importance of his thinking, as
well as the enduring legacy of militant democracy as a political idea. While the practical
examples of militant democracy today fall chronologically into the earlier part of Loewenstein’s
work – as of yet no nation has taken militant democracy to the logical conclusion that he did by
1944, believing that it is impossible for autocratic and democratic states to coexist – the ideas
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discussed by Loewenstein clearly have had a lasting influence of the way in which democracies
respond to potential enemies.337
Yet, despite these positive developments, as well as the fact that fascist Germany did not
reemerge to threaten the west, Loewenstein remained pessimistic for the remainder of his life.
Writing to Herz on October 13, 1960, Loewenstein is sharply critical of West Germany,
expressing sympathy with the Soviet controlled East, as the “youth in Eastern Germany derives
considerable satisfaction on building up a new country, and [this] achievement is considerable
enough to compensate for the loss of certain western freedoms.”338 While Loewenstein’s affinity
with a system that deprives citizens of their fundamental rights is not particularly surprising, it is
notable that Loewenstein compliments this system while criticizing West Germany, which by
1960 was a fully functioning, independent democratic state with a constitution that contained
many of Loewenstein’s theoretical ideas.
Writing again to Herz again on February 5, 1972, only a year before his death,
Loewenstein is still clearly pessimistic. Responding to a number of articles (which are not
named) that Herz had sent him, Loewenstein is highly critical of “the producers of the
behaviorist nonsense,” and believes that
I think we [Loewenstein and Herz] should borrow from them a piece of their thunder and add that
many of them, if not the majority, are Jewish, which does not seem to me purely accidental. I take
some names at random; The Almond, Aptel, de Sola Pool, Deutsch, Easton, Eulau and so on. I
have the hunch that plethora of Jews among the new scientists is a flashback to their former
Talmudic training. Most of what they do, the subtle distinctions, the use of mathematical or
psuedo-mathematical formulae, the graphs etc require a specific turn of mind that seems to me
altogether Talmudic. The attraction of the game lies also in the incapability of being checked or
controlled by objective standards. Nobody ever tests the formulae in practice. Of course this
cannot be said in public because “science” is “objective” and beyond bigoted bias. Nonetheless,
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it is worth considering.339

Although discussing the development of behaviorism and not militant democracy or fascism,
Loewenstein’s bitterness is readily apparent. Further, just as he did during his public campaign
for militant democracy in the years before World War II, Loewenstein is taking care to separate
himself from other Jews, going so far as to characterize Jewish thinking as coming from a
particular Talmudic state of mind that obviously, by implication, he does not share. Clearly the
pessimistic worldview that found expression in Loewenstein’s anxiety about fascism and
campaign for militant democracy is still, at this late date, in existence.
On his part, Herz remained optimistic. In 1981 he published a follow up to Political
Realism and Political Realism, “Political Realism Revisited” in International Studies Quarterly.
Here, Herz reaffirms much of his original writing, arguing again that man is driven by the
security dilemma, and that historically political systems can be defined as either realistic or
idealistic. He still believes that through a combination of these two systems, which he originally
described as Liberal Realism (a term that he does not use in this article), a peaceful international
system can be achieved. During the thirty years since his original work was published, Herz has
come to believe that two additional areas of inquiry are important as part of the effort to
understand international relations: the development of a more “sophisticated” understanding of
realism “that distinguishes ‘real’ facts and situations from the views of actors and publics have
formed about them,” and an inquiry into the idea of purpose, the “ought to of politics... not in the
utopian fashion of a moralist approach but in the sense of finding out what are attainable
objectives in international politics.”340
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As part of a more nuanced understanding of realism, Herz is interested in the role played
by “image and image-making, of status and ranking, of diplomatic symbolism, of recognition
and nonrecognition” in international relations.341 While he does not undertake this investigation
within this article (in fact “Political Realism Revisited” reads as more of a project proposal than
an argument driven essay), he believes that research along these lines is important and necessary.
In regards to purpose, to Herz the overriding concern behind international politics, in a “nuclear
age, where all have become penetrable,” must be world peace, and “purpose, therefore, in a
nuclear age, must be defined in a way that recognizes world peace as the overriding interest of
all.”342 Herz’s understanding here is, in effect, a doubling down of his belief in the possibility for
a world free of international conflict, a confirmation of the optimism seen originally in Political
Realism and Idealism. Even after the American failure in Vietnam and three decades of nuclear
standoff, he still imagines a future in which international politics can act as a means for mankind,
despite ideological and political differences, to create a world system that provides security and
obviates the security dilemma. Unlike Loewenstein, Herz was able to move past his pessimism.
This pessimism is essential to Loewenstein, and helps explain and reveal the distinctive
evolution of militant democracy from 1935 until 1946. Beginning with Loewenstein’s
“Autocracy Versus Democracy,” and ending with his critique of denazification following his exit
from government service, militant democracy transformed from temporary restrictions on
fascists to protect democracy into a full-fledged transformation of the democratic system,
underscored by the belief that democracies and autocracies could never coexist. This evolution,
and the documents that reveal it, are essential to understanding militant democracy. While
Loewenstein’s more extreme thinking never found its way into any modern constitutions or
341
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legislation, it still represents an example of how an émigré intellectual responded to the conflict
between democracy and fascism in the aftermath of his forced immigration from Germany due to
his ethnic heritage. Ignoring this story is a misunderstanding of Loewenstein and his work, as
well as his place within the greater émigré movement.
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